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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the ideas of Robert H. 
Jackson' s opening and c l osing speeches at the Nurnberg trial in t erms 
of the inventive process . These speeches present the speaker ' s ideas 
and were chosen by t he wri ter as the most appropriate sel ections 
embodying Jackson ' s ideas. 
Sources of Data 
Research has been gathered from the following kinds of sources : 
Jackson' s Opening and Cl osing Addresses ; cross- examinations of the 
defendants ; reports to the President; various accounts of the trial by 
the defendants , j usti ces , and other observers; and magazine articles 
published during the trial months. 
Major Findings 
J ackson , the speaker , is deal t with in the second chapter 
providi ng biographical material. Th i s information i ncl udes his 
1 
upbringing and his education. The development of his career as a 
lawyer is discussed. 
An account of the social setting at Nurnberg and the trial's 
audience are also included in the second chapter. These accounts 
help to stage the trial and describe the atmosphere in which 
Jackson presents his speeches. 
2 
The third chapter provides an outline of the methodology used 
in the study. It establishes the criteria and describes the procedure 
that is followed. 
Next , the speeches are analyzed in the fourth chapter. A 
description of how Jackson's philosophy was applied is provided. 
The Opening and Closing Addresses are discussed and their effect 
upon the Tribunal, the trial outcane, and history is cited. 
A brief description of each defendant, his association with the 
Nazi party, and charges of indictment are also given. Along with the 
description of the defendants, the four counts of indictment upon 
which the defendants were charged is mentioned in the fourth chapter. 
Conclusions 
The last chapter summarizes the information given in the thesis 
and analyzes the significance of the speeches and their impact on the 
trial and on history. 
The chapter also gives an account of the sentences given to each 
of the defendants is also provided. 
An appendix and bibliography accompany the thesis. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
I . Introduction 
Long before Justice Robert H. Jackson became a part of the 
Nurnberg trial , the Departments of War, State , and Justice had been 
pondering the idea of bringing t h e top Naz i l eaders and organ-
izations to trial as criminals. When discuss i ons began for an inter-
national trial of Nazi war criminals, Fra nklin Delano Roosevelt was 
the President of the United States . A conference h a d been held a t 
Ya l ta , a city in the Soviet Union, to discuss in general terms such 
a trial. This conference was attended by President Roosevelt, 
Winston Churchill, a nd Joseph Stalin in 1945 . President Roosevelt 
died later that year at a time when Judge Samuel I . Rosenman was 
abroad obtaining an agreement among the nations on a plan of trial. 
Judge Rosenman ' s duties ended after a presentation in San Francisco 
to t h e Soviet , French , and British Foreign Ministers . It was at this 
point that Justice Robert H. Jackson assumed the task of negotiating 
among these nations . 
The first public announcement of the upcoming trial, and the 
United States ' involvement , came in a report released by 
President Harry Truman o n June 7, 1945 . President Truman ' s approval 
of the program was widely published in Europe and served as a point 
of reference from which following proposal s were studied. 
1 
2 
On August 8 , 1945, the Ag r eement of London was signed by the 
United Kingdom , the Soviet Union, France , and the United States . 
The agreement sanctioned an I nternational Mil i tary Tribunal. It was 
from t h is agreement a nd the contents thereof that J ustice Jackson 
took t he theme of his Opening Speech. The theme and content s o f 
Jackson' s Closing Speech were taken from the evidence presented 
during the trial. Justice J ackson wrote , " The Opening Statement 
and the Clos ing Speech for the United State s , one anticipating , t he 
other reviewing the evidence , state the substance of the c onspiracy 
case against the individual defe ndants . 11 1 
It was a respect for the skill and l ead e rship of Justice 
Jackson , the significance of his opening and c l o sing remarks, a nd 
the impact of the trial itself on a troubled world that provided the 
motivation for the writer to undertak e this study . 
I I . Statement of the Problem 
The purpose of this s tudy is to e xamine the ideas of 
Robert Jackson ' s op e ning and closing speeches in terms of t he 
inventive process . Invention involves the attempt on the part o f 
the orator , Cicero says , as reflected b y Thonssen and 
Baird , " to find out what he should say . ... " It i s an 
1 Robert H. J ack son , The Nilrnberg Case (New York: Cooper Square 
Publishers , Inc ., 1971), p. i x. 
2 
Lest er Thonssen and A. Craig Baird , Spe ech Criticism (New 
York : The Ronald Press Co ., 1948), p.79 . 
3 
investigative undertaking, embracing a survey and forecast of the 
subject and a search for the arguments suitabl e to the given rhetori -
cal effect. Thus certain writers -Aristotle among them- give more 
attention to invention than to other parts of rhetoric . This is 
done on the ground that the content is the most important part of 
3 
the speech. Jackson ' s opening and closing speeches present the 
speaker ' s ideas . These two speeches have , therefore , been selected 
by the writer as the most appropriate selections embodying Jackson ' s 
ideas . 
The range of this study has been limited to an analysis of the 
speaker's ideas and the action arising from those ideas . The 
answers to two questions should be discussed in an analysis of the 
speeches in addition to certain conclusions about Jackson's ideas : 
first , the effect of the speeches on the outcome of the trial; and 
second , the influence of J a ckson ' s ideas upon international law and 
concepts of general warfare. 
In deciding upon this plan , the writer felt that the speaker ' s 
addresses are more than bombast . The purpose of public 
addresses is not merely to make possible an opportunity for speakers 
to exercise their rhetorical skills, but to make valuable 
contributions to the affairs of man. (Not on l y do speakers make 
3 
Ibid . 
valuable contributions , but the criti cs as well by analyzing the 
speaker ' s works . ) As Ernest J . Wrage states , "They (students of 
4 
public address ) possess credentials worthy of acknowledgment and 
interest in a type of materials germane to the object . 11 4 Albert 
J . Croft also expressed the same bel ief in that "criticism s hould 
go beyond concern with purely formal rhetorical conceptions ; it 
must enter the fie l d of making specific value judgments of the 
appropriateness and rightness of the idea adaptation to be found in 
5 
speeches. " Cr oft a l so suggests of the speech criti c that one 
objective is the historical function of rhetoric . With this 
objective Croft would have the critic "report and interpret the 
manner in which a speaker ' s values have b een related ~o the social 
values of his audiences in the course of his rhetorical adaptation . 11 6 
The function of thiswriter is that of both anal yst and critic. In 
order to criticize a speech one must be able to first analyze the 
speech and evaluate the credibility and effectiveness of the speech . 
The focus of this study is upon the viewpoints of the speaker 
concerning his concepts of man , his ideas, a nd the society in which 
he lives . An a nalysis of rhetoric includes a great deal more than 
most persons realize . The subjects of history , philsophy , and public 
4 Robert L. Scott and Bernard L. Brock, Methods of Rhetorical 
Criticism (New York : Harper & Row , Publishe rs , 1972), p . 105 . 
5 Albert J . Croft , "The Functions of Rhetorical Criticism, " 
Quartely Journal of Speech, Vol. LXII (Oct. , 1956), p.291 . 
6 Ibid ., p.287 . 
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speaking are interrelated and to analyze speeches all of these must 
be considered . A critic must not onl y study the speaker ' s ideas , but 
the influence of the ideas contained in public speeches upon history. 
The circumstances of the Nlirnberg trial are appropriate for an 
idea centered study . The trial revolves around the ideas of men and 
nations and the organization of those ideas and the laws of nations 
to serve as the framework of the trial. It was Justice Jackson who 
organized the trial and who worked closely with the other nations ' 
leaders to mold these different and varied ideas and laws into a 
viable format for the trial . 
Justice Jackson expressed these ideas in his opening and 
closing speeches . It was the ideas and beliefs of individual 
nations cooperating with each other in creating an international 
military tribunal and the construction of a trial of tnis nature that 
made a study of ideas pragmatic and operational . 
III. Definition of Terms 
The legal terms used in Jackson ' s speeches need defining . It 
is the decision of the writer that it is best to present these terms 
in a glossary in the appendix to this work. This procedure will be 
a more convenient reference for the reader of the two speeches . Also 
certain words and names of cities and people involved will be 
referred to by the German names. The glossary will include the 
translation of these words and names. 
IV. Statement of Organization 
This study contains five chapters with the addi tion of a 
bibliography and glossary. 
6 
Chapter II deals with Jackson , the speaker and the atmosphere 
in which he delivered the two speeches . It includes biographical 
material on Jackson. This chapter also brings to the surface a 
synopsis of Jackson ' s background and deve l opment of the ideas that 
surround his speeches. Certain other biographical material is 
discussed for the purpose of understanding the speeches. A critic 
cannot sufficiently examine the speeches of any speaker without 
including a biographical study also . The writings of all speakers 
reveal certain facts concerning their background. I t is important 
for the critic to understand the speaker ' s background in order to 
understand the speaker ' s work . 
An account of the social setting at Nlirnberg and the trials ' 
audience are also included in Chapter II. These accounts will help 
to stage the trial and describe the atmosphere in which Jackson had 
to present his speeches. 
Chapter III outlines the methodology used in this study. It is 
a descripti on of criteria and procedure. 
The speeches are anal yzed i n Chapter I V. Along with a brief 
sketch of the defendents and the counts of t he indic tments . This 
chapter accomplishes the purpose of this work; i.e . the study of the 
ideas and their impli cations in Jackson ' s speeches. 
Chapter V compri ses a summary and conclusion. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND AND THE SETTING 
I. The Background of the Speaker 
"Throughout his career as a lawyer {in both private 
and public practice) and as a judge , Jackson maintained 
close ties with the organized bar. He identified strongly 
and positively with his pr ofessi on , and many of his 
opinions - as well as his extramural writing - refl ect his 
deep i nterest of the interests of l awyers . His continuing 
preoccupation with the practice of l aw made him an 
authentic spokesman for the l egal profession ... More than 
any other Supreme Court justice in this century , Robert 
Jackson was the voice of the bar , speaking from the 
bench. 111 
Jackson's main concern was the failure of his colleagues to 
live up to the high s tandards of j udic i al neutrality. Although he 
felt that justice should be "dispassionate," he was very "human " 
and "not unpassionate. 112 Since the mid-fifties many of the beli efs 
held by Jackson have changed, but the two problems that concerned 
him most still remain; " the social and economical issues that con-
3 
front the political decision makers of today." These same social 
and economic problems were a great part of the Niirnberg trial. 
Jackson valued both individual freedom and social s t ability. 
He fel t that public policy-making was the responsibility of the 
1 Glendon Schubert , Dispassionate Justice: A Synthesis of the 
Judicial Opinions of Robert H. Jackson {New York: The Bobbs- Merrill 
Company , Inc., 1969), p. vii . 
2 
Ibid. 
3 Ibid., p. viii. 
7 
8 
Congress and the President, not the Supreme Court. He also felt, 
however , that in matters between the national and state governments , 
and among the states , the proper courts should make the necessary 
deci sions. Just as the matters between states should be the 
responsibility of the national government, the matters between 
nations should be the responsibility of the International Tribunal. 
Robert Houghwout Jackson was born in the small town of Spring 
Creek , Pennsylvania, February 13, 1892. His growing years and most 
influential ones were during the Progressive Era in American politi cs. 
Jackson was typical of most Americans his age; no coll ege education , 
only high school. "His father raised , raced , and traded horses 114 
and most of the people he knew and with whom he associated were of 
the same profession . His early opinions and educational beliefs were 
directly influenced by the Chautauqua Institute in southwestern New 
York, established in 1874 as a summer adult education program . These 
were the forces that shaped Jackson ' s thinking and his way of life 
and living . 
At the time Jackson attended the Chautauqua Institute there were 
some 200 courses being taught by the faculty of leading colleges and 
normal schools. These courses purported to offer the best that the 
educational world could afford in the literature, arts , and sciences. 
It may be significant that the Chautauqua system of education soon 
became known for the expression of liberal views . 5 
4 Ibid., p. ix. 
5 
The Encyclopaedia Britannica , 11th Edition (New York: The 
Encycl opaedia Britannica Company , 1910), p . 19. 
9 
In 1913 he was admitted to the bar after completing a course at 
the Albany Law School. He began practicing law in Jamestown, New 
York, and became general counsel for several local public service 
corporations. While Jackson was serving on a commission to study 
the New York State judicial system, New York Governor , Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, was impressed with Jackson's beliefs and capabilities. 
Later, when Roosevelt became President of the United States , he 
appointed Jackson as general counsel of the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue (1934). In 1 935 he became special counsel to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, and in 1936 , assistant attorney general in 
charge of the antitrust division, then, solicitor general of the 
United States in 1938. 
Jackson became one of Roosevelt ' s cabinet members in 1940 by 
accepting the position of attorney general . Only eighteen months 
later he was sworn in as associate justice of the Supreme Court. In 
Washington, Jackson was known as "FDR's brightest young legal eagle. 116 
In May 1945, President Harry S. Truman appointed him to the War 
Crimes Commission serving as chief prosecutor for the United States 
due to establishment of the International Military Tribunal. When 
the trial was over in 1946 he returned to the Supreme Court remaining 
until his death, October 9, 1954. He continued throughout to be 
vigorous and outspoken. 
"Jackson ' s judicial career is the story of the denouement and 
dissolution of his political ambitions . For most small- town lawyers 




aspirations for office and public prefennent;" but for "Bob 
Jackson," it was onl y second best to his great accomplishments and 
influential speeches during the Nurnberg trial . 
II. Aspects of the Speaker's Personality 
To be able to analyze the speaker ' s work , more than a 
chronological biography is needed. In this section the writer studies 
Jackson's personal ity and specific incidents of his life that helped 
to shape the man and his work. Thonssen and Baird quote Cicero to 
the effect that a speaker's character contributes to his success in 
speaking if " the morals , principles , conduct, and lives of those who 
plead causes , and for those whom they plead, are s uch as to merit 
t .. 8 es eem .... He goes on to say that the "feelings of the hearers are 
conciliated by a person's dignity, by his actions , by the character 
of his life .... 119 Simply stated by John Lord O' Brian , Esq., a close 
friend of Jackson , 
"I realize more and more what the factor of personality 
means in public life , in providing a man with the gift of 
influence. That elusive element, which I think you will 
agree is so often missed by biographers and historians , is 
to me a very important element in the evolution of Robert 
Jackson. 1110 
7 Ibid. 
8 Thonssen and Baird, op. cit., p. 384-385 . 
9 Ibid., p. 385. 
l0 Charles s. Desmond, Paul A. Freund, Potter Stewart, and Lord 
Shawcross, Mr. Justice Jackson: Fou r Lectures in His Honor (New 
York: Columbia Univer sity Press, 1969), 7-8. 
11 
Gr owing up as a farmboy in northwestern Pennsylvania , Jackson's 
formal education wa s limited . Afte r finishing high school, he 
borrowed the money to attend the Albany Law School. He only 
attended for one term , however , Thi s brief schooling was the extent 
of his formal education which is one of the remarkable factors in 
his public success . 
He was ambitious and his "rare quali ties of character 1111 
were two of the mos t important e l ements that made J ackson a success-
fu l lawyer and judge . O ' Brian attributes his success not onl y to his 
"unusual ability as a lawyer , but also from the character of his own 
personality and the great charm which he exerci sed over everybody 
with whom he came in contact . 1112 
Jackson was an independent man and held strong convictions . He 
was not easily persuaded to change his opinions or reverse his 
judicial decisions. He could never have been called a ' yes man . ' 
One incident of this occurred when a Senator opposing confirmation 
of Jackson ' s appointment as General Counsel to the Internal Revenu e 
Bureau stated that the Secretary of the Treasury was seeking a ' yes 
man .' Jackson ' s hometown newspaper printed in the ir report of the 




story that "if the cabinet member requires a 'yes man ' we may expect 
13 Mr. Jackson back home in Jamestown a t an early date ." His 
independence was a l so evident in his str-ong outspoken positions on ' 
political party issues (Jackson was a member of t he Democratic 
party) and cases such as the one involving strikers accused of 
rioting . One of his favorite quotations was a line from Kipling: 
" He travels farthest who travels alone. 11 14 
Another of Jackson' s outstanding characteristics was that of 
humility . He was devoted to his friends and he felt a sense of 
obligation to them. One example is that of a school teache r in 
Jamestown: she had taken a special interest in him and helped him 
to develop his fine qualities at an early age . Later, he mentioned 
her every time the opportunity arose and told of his appreciation 
for her help . 
Along with humility Jackson's humor added greatly in molding 
the man . O' Brian said that "he was not given to anecdotal humor or 
smart aleck phrases , or telling stories . But he was gifted with 
15 
that old Elizabethan folk humor in the true sense. " 
13 Ibid., p . 18. 
14 Ibid ., p . 10 . 
1 5 Ibid., p . 13 . 
13 
As for his literary style , he was known for his clarity , 
directness , and simplicity. He seldom used metaphors or other 
figures of speech . Law professors have said that his writing 
developed while on the Supreme Court were of a rich and meaningful 
16 
English style. He often spoke to various c lubs and his speeches 
were always a success containing both humorous and serious thoughts . 
Thus his writing method was also a contributing factor to his per-
sonal ity and success . 
To conclude , it is very frustrating to try to d escribe such a 
man in a few words. Perhaps former Chief Judge Charles s . Desmond 
says it best, 
"I [ saw] him as a practical dre amer, holding fast to 
one of the best and oldest dreams of our race - the 
dream of prompt and equal justice for all the members 
of our free society .... Thus was the country lawyer , 
Robert Houghwout Jacks on7 at home with the people who loved and trusted him. 111 
III . Social Setting at Nurnberg 
The task of reconstructing the social setting in which speeches 
are given is challenging . It must be realized that " speeches are 
16 . 
Ibid., p. 9. 
17 Ibid., p. 28 . 
14 
events occurring in highly complex situations" and that "not all 
events happening at a moment of cri sis or momentous public occasion 
are likely to be recorded . 11 18 I n the situations that are recorded 
the decision as to what to record a nd what to omit has a great impact 
on the speeches and how they are anal yzed . It would be impossible 
to analyze a speech from the speaker 's written style and a simple 
examination of the tex t "without regard to the e vents which gave 
19 rise to the delivery of the speech ." 
In this section the critic studies the social setting at 
Nlirnberg and the events that led to the trial . 
The German people as a whole were never indicted b ecause it 
was the feeling of the four victorious powers that t he crimes we re 
not the results of the general population , but a result of the 
20 "terror of the concentration camps and the police state ." Justice 
Jackson in his opening speech stated , "We have no purpose to 
incriminate the whole of the German people . We know that the Nazi 
. 21 
Party was not put into power by a maJority of the German vote •.• . " 
18 
Thonssen and Baird , op. cit ., p. 312 . 
19 Ibid . 
20 Eugene Davidson , The Trial of the Germans (New York: The 




The German people themselves , however , felt a "collective guilt" 
and a sense o f responsibility for what had happened . 
"In Nil.rnberg as in the result of Germany the threadbare peopl e 
who had survived the war cared very little what was in store for the 
men who i n the space of twelve years had helped to make the German 
Reich the master o f Europe and to destroy it. 11 23 The tragi c and 
inhumane t r eatment of the people was s till too real in their minds 
and little sympathy for the war c riminals could pe f e lt. 
The nations conducting the trial, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, the French Republic , and the U, S .S .R. , were very strong i n 
their feelings also , and cited "violations of the law and customs of 
war , criminal acts against the civilia n population of occupied 
nations , and crimes against peace a nd conspiracy to wage aggressive 
war 11 24 as the basis for the Nlirnberg trial. 
As for the courtroom atmosphere , the same type of animosity was 






Robert K. Woetzel , The Nlirnberg Trials in International Law 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger , Inc ., 1960) , p . 6 . 
"we encountered only hostile faces, icy dogmas . The only 
exception was the interpreter's booth. From there I might 
expect a friendl y nod. Among t h e British and American 
prosecutors there were also some who occasionally 
manifested a trace of sympathy. I was taken aback when 
t he journalists began laying bets on the extent of our 
penal ties , and t heir list of those slated for hanging 
sometimes included Ime] . 1125 
16 
There were also spectators in the gallery looki ng down on the 
proceedings and down on the defendants. Another of the defendants, 
Hans Fritzche , wrote, 
" •. . these visitors gazed at us ... as if we were animals in 
a circus and I could not help being struck by t he cruel 
contrast between the atmosphere of a social function 
which they brought with them into a court and the ever-
present shadow of the gallows which loomed over us . ... A 
German lawyer, about six feet away , [pointed] out each 
of us in turn to a group of school girls and [explained] 
after the manner of a tourist guide, who all [of us 
were] . 1126 
Thus, the social setting at Niirnberg, both inside and outside 
the courtroom, was one of distrust and hatred, with a bitter taste 
left by the destruction and terror caused by those on trial. 
IV. The Audience 
One of the Aristotelian concepts of rhetoric is concerned with 
audiences. Aristotle defines rhetoric as "the faculty of discovering 
25 Albert Speer, Inside The Third Reich (New York : The Macmil lan 
Company, 1970), p. 514. 
26 Hans Fritzche , The Sword in the Scal es (London: Allen Wingate 
Publishers, 1953), p. 68-69. 
17 
all the possibl e means of persuasion in any subject. 1127 Thonssen 
and Baird interpret this definition to mean that "rhe t oric is an 
instrument by which a speaker can . . . make ?n adjustment to a situati o n 
composed of himself, his audience , his subject , and the occasion . 11 28 
Aristotle believed , as do most all writers and critics , that the 
. 29 
"audi ence dete rmine ' s the speech's end and obJect ." An important 
aspect of the speech situation is the " speaker-audience relation-
30 
ship . " Certainly in Jackson's situatio n his entire speeches a nd 
their written style and delivery were geared toward persuading his 
audience . In the case of trials the audience i s most importan t in 
determining the speech ' s " end and object. 11 3 1 
In discussing the audience of the trial two d i visions are made. 
These are the same divisions as used in the section on the social 
/ 
setting : inside and outside the courtroom. 
First , inside the courtroom . The tribunal consisted of four 
members and four alternates . The judges were : 
27 
Aristotle , The Rhetoric of Aristotle , trans. Lane Cooper , 
(New York: Appleton-Century- Crofts , Inc., 1960), p . 7. 
28 
Thonssen and Baird, op. cit. , p . 15. 
29 
Ibid. 
3 o Ibid . 
31 Ibid . 
"Sir Geoffrey Lawrence , representing the United Kingdom, 
who was elected Chairman of the Tribunal; his alternate, 
18 
Sir Wi lliam Norman Birkett; Mr. Francis Biddle , representing 
the United States, and his alternate, Judge John J. Parker; 
M. le Professor Donnedieu de Vabres, representing France, 
and his alternate, M. le Conseiller Falco; and Major-
General I. T . Nikitchenko, representing the Soviet Union, 
and his a l ternate, Lt.-Colonel A. F. Volchov. The 
prosecution was in the hands of Mr. Robert H. Jackson, 
Chief of Counsel for the U.S.A.; Sir Hartley Shawcross, 
Ch ief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom; M. Francois de 
Menthon, Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic; and 32 
General R. A. Rudenko , Chief Prosecutor for the u.s.s.R. " 
"The accused had the services of 27 leading counsels, 54 
assistants , and 67 secretaries. "33 During the proceedings 
[the judges] appeared dressed in their judicial robes, 
with the exception of the Russi ans, who wore military 
uniforms. 1134 (The French wore gold-coloured robes; the 
Americans and British, plain dark gowns.) 35 
Originally 24 men were to be tried, but on October 25 , 1 945, 
Robert Ley col!lTlitted suicide . The trial of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen 
und Hal bach had been postponed indefinitely owing to serious illness. 
Martin Bormann who was not in the custody of the Tribunal was tried 
32 Woetzel , op. cit., p. 1. 
33 Joe J. Heydecker and Johannes Leeb , The Nurnberg Trial 
(Cleveland, Ohio : The World Publishing Company, 1962). 
34 Davidson, The Trial of The Germans , p. 20. 
35 't h 't 69 Fri zc e , op. ci ., p. . 
19 
in a bsentia. The other defendants were Herman Wilhelm Goering , 
Joachim von Ribbentrop , Wilhelm Keitel, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Hans 
Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Alfred Rosenberg , Julius Streicher , Fritz 
Sauckel, Alfred Jodl , Arthur Seyss-Inquart , Rudolph Hess, Walter 
Funk, Erich Raeder , Baldur von Schirach, Albert Speer , Constantin 
von Neurath , Karl Doenitz, Hjalmar Schacht , Franz von Papen , and Hans 
Fritzche. The d e fendant groups and organizations were: The Leader-
ship Corps of the Nazi Party; Die Schutzstaffeln , known as the SS; 
Der Sicherheitsdienst , known as the SD ; and Die Geh eime Staatspolizei, 
known as the Gestapo , or Secret State Police ; Die Sturmabteilungen, 
known as the SA ; the Reichscabinet; and the General Staff and High 
36 
Command of the German Armed Forces . 
The courtoom was on the second floor of the Palace of Justice i n 
37 
Nlirnberg , Germany and held some 600 people. The witnesses in the 
courtroom were: 33 for the prosecution , 61 for the defense , and 143 
'd f h d d b f · · 38 who gave evi ence o r t e efen ants y way o interrogatories ; 
altogether there were 240 witnesses and 300,000 sworn statements39 
presented in the case . Among others admitted were the interpreters 
36 Woetzel , op . cit. , p . 1-2 . 
37 Davidson , The Trial of the _Germans, p . 21. 
38 Woetzel , p . 2 . 
39 Heydecker and Leeb , op. cit ., p . 94 . 
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who translated the trial into four l angu_ages; English , German , 
Russian , and French. "Every word was simultaneously translated ..• 
and every seat in the room was fitted with earphones and a dial 
40 
which permitted the listener to switch to any of the four languages .'' 
Court stenographers , news reporters , and those of special capacities, 
such as George Bailey who was a Russian Liason and Interpretor-
41 
Translator were also part of the audience . The photographers , film 
operators , etc . "hailed from every country under the sun and spoke 
every imaginable language , and their equipment ranged from the 
smal l est handcameras to the largest motion picture machines on robust 
tripods , many of them were German manufactured . 1142 "The press box 
held 250 newspapermen who had come from all over the world ... But only 
five German press representatives were admitted . 1143 " • • • all members 
of the prisoners' fami lies were specifically debarred from the 
hearings. Jodl's plucky wife alone was able to gain permission to 
attend the court and she came in the capacity of assistant to her 
husband's counsel. 1144 In the gallery "were smartly- dressed women ... , 




George Bailey, Germans (New York : World Publishing Company, 
Fritzche, op. cit ., p . 64 . 
43 Heydecker and Leeb , op. cit. , p. 93 . 
44 
Fritzche , op . cit . , p. 68 . 
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but they were the wives of officials of the victorious nation s who 
had come to l ook down from their e minence on the scene in which their 
45 husbands were to distinguish themselves." It must be noted , however , 
that the number of people in the courtroom varied from day to day . 
The audience outside the courtroom varied from day to day also . 
It can be said that the entire worl d was the audience for the 
Nilrnberg trial because of the news r eporting and widespread publicity. 
The final speeches of the defendants were heard over radio. Albert 
Speer said that " since these speeches were to be broadcast in full 
over radio , they had special significance. 1146 
Suc h was the audience of the Nurnberg trial. Again quoting 
Thonsse n and Baird , "Critics of oratory are generally agreed that 
the effectiveness of oratory is a function of a udience adaptation; 
that it must be regarded in the light of what people do as a result 
47 
of hearing the speech." Obviously , the effectiveness of Jackson's 
opening and closing speeches to the Nilrnberg trial were dependent 
upon the audience: t he judges for their verdicts and the rest of the 
world for their realization that everyone "must now be aware that they 
too may be condemned as international criminals , if they offend 
against the laws of nations, if they instigate or· prepare wars of 
45 Ibid. 
46 Speer , p ' t 519 o . ci . , p. . 
47 Thonssen and Baird, op . cit ., p . 79. 
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aggression , if they apply laws that are in violati on of the laws of 
humanity, or if they persecute groups or persons whose rights are 
recognized by most civi lized nations ." 48 
48 Woetzel, op . cit., p . xiv . 
CHAPTER III 
PROCEDURE AND CRITERIA 
I. Establishment of Criteria 
This study of Justic Jackson ' s speeches approaches rhetorical 
criticism not from the traditional method of analysis which is to 
examine a n orator's work on the basis of literary style and means 
of persuasion , but from an analysis of the speaker' s ideas and t he 
. 1 
"action fostered by the speech." It is not t h e intention of this 
study to imply that t h e importance of literary styl e and means of 
persuasion do not weigh as heavily as the importance of the speaker 's 
ideas on the social setting to the overall success of the work . 
However , the primary concern of this study is the method of evaluating 
the "pattern of thought and action . 11 2 The approach , therefore , will 
be focused on the speaker ' s ideas and the relation of those ideas 
to the social setting . 
The decision to focus th~ study of Jackson ' s ideas and their 
relation to the social setting is based upon the circumstances of 
the Nilrnberg trial and the importance of that trial not only to the 
defendants , but to the world and legitimate warfare . 
1 
Thonssen and Baird , op . cit. , p . 72 . 
2 Ibid . 
23 
24 
Thonssen and Baird in Speech Criticism state that "the ideas 
which live within the memories of succeeding generations , and the 
ideas whose integrity are tested and appraised more often in l ater 
history, are the one ' s which deliberative speakers have developed 
in addresses on the burning issues of their time . 11 3 Certainly the 
Niirnberg trial was a burning issue of its time and Jackson ' s 
addresses made during the course of the trial are worthy of analysis 
from the viewpoint of the ideas presented. 
In order to test and appraise Jac k son ' s speeches, their logical 
content, validity , and significance must be examined. The method of 
evaluating the integrity of ideas , according to Thonssen and Baird , 
" should be determined on the basis of how ful ly a given speech 
enforces an idea ; how closely that enforcement conforms to the general 
rules of argumentative development; and how near the totality of the 
reasoning approaches a measure of truth adequate for purposes of 
4 
action ." Although the integrity of ideas cannot be determined by 
any specific set of rules , a critic must obtain a method either 
established by himself or another source . Therefore in this study 
the method recognized by Thonssen and Baird will be employed in 
analyzing the integrity of ideas in Justice Jackson ' s speeches of the 
prosecution. 
3 
Ibid ., p. 334 . 
4 Ibid . 
..... 
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As a r e sult of the method use d f o r this s tudy , J ack s on ' s 
attitudes t oward man and the soci e ty in whic h he l ive s mus t be 
examined to fully unde r s t a nd the me aning of his speeches a nd their 
impl ica tio ns . This exami natio n r equires a d i scl osure of the foll owing 
a ttitude s : 
1 . J ackson ' s ideas , ho w t h e y were presented and ho w he 
de veloped the m. 
2. J ackson ' s p h ilosophy of law a nd judic i a l proce dure. This 
involve s a n i nv es~igation of J ack s on ' s l ife , education, a nd 
car eer; a l so a probe into J ackson 1s supreme court de cisions 
as outlined in Chapter II ~ 
3 . What was Jackson attempting t o do? 
4 . Was his attempt consistent with h i s own background and t h e 
c i rcumstances of the trial ? 
This methodology constitutes t h e standard by which the ideas were 
analyzed i n J ackson ' s speeches . 
II . Obtaining and Establ ishing the Authenticity of the Texts 
The complete text o f Jackson ' s speeches were obtained from a 
book enti tled The Nilrnberg Case wri t ten b y Rob e rt H. Jackson himself. 5 
S . k 1 . Jae son , oc . c it . 
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The speeches in this book were taken from the o~iginal tran-
scripts of the tri al . Justice Jackson in the Preface of the book , 
states that the speeches and cross-examinations ''As here presented 
are taken from the official transcript before revision . 11 6 




Report to the President of the U.S. , June 7 , 1945 , 
Four-Power Agreement for Trials and Charter of Jnter n 
national Military Tribunal, August 8 , 1 945 , 
Open~ng Statement for the United States , November 21 , 
1945. 
IV. The Law Under Which Nazi Organizations Are Accused of 
Bei_ng Criminal , Arguments by R,obert H. Jackson, 
February 28, 1946, 
v. Closing Address, July 26, 1946, 
VI . Excerpts from Cross-Examination of Defendants . 
In the Preface Justice Jackson states, 
"The mission of this book is to make conveniently available 
fundamental information about the world ' s first international 
criminal assizes . There are four thousand documentary exhibits 
making up some seventeen thousand pages which could be read by 
7 
all , but few will find the time or take the time to read them." 
6 Ibid. , p . x. 
7 
Ibid. , p . v . 
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Jackson ' s book condenses the trial into 269 pages which can be easil y 
read. By including the whole of his opening and c l osing statements , 
Jackson gives the circumstances -of the c~se and the conclusion allowing 
his readers to understand "what was being done in their name - abroad and 
8 
to invite support for the principles on which the case was founded." 
III. Selection of Speeches 
The speeches sel ected for t his study are the f ollow~ng : 
1. Justice Jackson's opening address to the jur y during 
the Nlirnberg trial. The speech was delivered November 
21 , 1945 a t the Palace of Justice , NUrnberg , Germany . 
2 . The summation or closing statement to t he jury during 
the Nlirnberg trial. The speech was del ivered July 26 1 
1946 at the Palace of Justice , Nlirnberg , Germany. 
Thonssen and Baird say that 1'oratory to be great must deal with 
9 
ideas which make a difference i n the affairs of men and states . " 
The Nlirnbe rg trial dealt with ideas which made a difference in the 
affairs of men , states , and nations. The beginning of that trial 
with the statement of what was at stake, the predicted effect that 
its outcome would have on the world, receives a most forceful state~ 
ment i n the opening address, The same is true of the summation which 
would lead to a decision that would cha_nge the course of international 
law and the laws of l egitimate warfare . The study is therefore 
focused upon the two speeches . 
8 Ibid. , p . v . 
9 
Thonssen and Baird , op. cit ., p. 332. 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF THE SPEECHES 
I . The Counts of Indictments and Defendants 
Preliminary to the analysis of the speeches the writer fee l s 
that a brief identification of each defendant will be helpful. The 
following will enabl e the r eader to understand who the defendants 
were , their participation in the war crimes, and the counts upon 
which they were indicted. 
First , the counts upon which they were indicted . 
Count 1: Crime of plotting and waging wars of a_ggression. 
Count 2: Crime of wars in violation of nine treaties to which 
Germany was a party . 
Count 3: Crime of violating International Law. 
1 
Count 4: Crimes against humanity . 
Second , brief identifications of the defendants . 
Hermann Wilhelm Goering was the chief defendant . He was the 
former Reichsmarschall who was designated as Hitler ' s successor , He 
was called "the leading war aggressor, both as political and as 
military leader; . .. the director of the slave labor program and the 
l Jackson, The Nurnberg Case , p. 82 . 
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creator of the oppressive program against the Jews and other races , 
at home and abroad ." Near the end of the war Hitler accused him of 
high treason and ordered his arrest. Goering was i ndicted on all 
four counts. 
Joachim von Ribbentrop was the Foreign Minister of the Nazi 
Reich. He participated in the aggressive plans against various 
nations and was held responsible for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. Ribbentrop was considered one of the vai nest and most 
incompetent of the men around the Fueher. He was indicted on all 
four counts . 
Wilhelm Keitel served as Chief of the High Command of the German 
Armed Forces. He participated in the aggressive p l ans against 
several countries1 war crimes, and crimes against humanity . He signed 
the not orious "Nacht und Nebel" decree which provided that in 
occupied territories civilians who had been accused of crimes of 
resistance against the army of occupation would be tried only if the 
death sentence was likel y; otherwise they would be handed over to 
the Gestapo and transported to Germany . Keitel was indicted on all 
four counts. 
Ernst Kaltenbrunner was Chief of the Security Police and S.D. 
and head of the Reich Security Head Office , an organization which 
supervised the murder of approximatel y four million Jews in 
concentration camps . He was indi cted on counts one , three , and 
four. 
30 
Hans Frank served as Governor- General of Poland under the Nazi 
regime . He was called "a willing and knowing participant in the 
use of terrorism in Poland; in the economic exploitation of Poland 
in a way which led to the death by starvation of a large number of 
peopl e; in the deportation to Germany as slave laborers of over a 
million Poles ; and in a program involving the murder of at three 
million Jews. " Frank was indicted on counts one , t hree, and four . 
Wilhelm Frick was the supreme Reich authority in Bohemia and 
Moravia. He was held responsible for terrorism of the population , 
s l ave l abor , and the deportation of Jews to the concentrati on camps 
for extermination. Frick was indicted on all four counts. 
Alfred Rosenberg was the Reich Minister for the Occupied 
Eastern Territories . He was supposed to have played an important 
role in the preparati on and planning of the attack on Norway, and to 
have hel ped in formul ating the policies of Germanisation, exploitation, 
forced labor , extermination of Jews and opponents of Nazi rule in the 
Occupied Eastern Territories. Rosenberg was indicted on all four 
counts . 
Julius Streicher was the publi sher of "Der Stlirmer" , an anti-
semitic weekly newspaper. He was held responsible for incitement to 
murder and extermi nation at a time when Jews in the East were being 
killed under the most horrible conditions. He was indicted on counts 
one and four. 
31 
Fritz Sauckel held the position of Plenipotentiary-General 
for the utilization of Labour . He was in charge of the forced labor 
of more than six million men and wome n. Sauckel had br~ught convoys 
of foreign workers to Germany from all the countries of Europe. 
Sauckel was indicted on all four counts. 
Alfred Jodl had been Chief of the Operations Staff of the High 
Command of the German Anned Forces . Jodl was held responsible for 
participating in the planni_ng of an attack against various nations , 
and for supporting the notorious Commando Order a nd the directive 
for "Case Barbarossa" which contains a plan to e liminate Soviet 
commissars . He also ordered the evacuation of a l l persons in 
northern Norway and the burning of their homes so that they could not 
be of help to the Russians. Alfred Jodl was also indicted on all 
four counts . 
Arthur Seyss-Inquart was the Reich Commissioner of the 
Netherlands. The Judgment states that he "was a knowing and 
voluntary participant in War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity 
which were committed in the occupation of the Netherlands. " These 
crimes included the deportation of J ews to the Auschwitz 
extermination camp , the ruthless suppression of all opposition to the 
Gennan occupation , the economic exploitation of the Netherlands 
without regard for rules of the Hague Convention , and the deportation 
of forced labourers to Germany . He was indicted on all four counts. 
Rudolph Hess was the former Deputy to Hitler and successor 
designate to the Flihrer after Goering . The British jailers 
32 
thought him insane , but a report from the prison psychologist , stated 
that there was nothing to show that Hess did not realize the nature 
of the charges against him, or was incapable of defending himself. 
Hess was involved i n German aggression against Austria, Czechoslavakia, 
and Poland. He was indicted on all four counts . 
Walter Funk had participated in the early Nazi program of 
economi c discrimination against the J ews. Funk was the President of 
the Reichsbank. The Tribunal felt that Funk knew about and deliberately 
ignored the fact that, while in concentration camps, the gold from 
eyeglasses and gold teeth and fillings of the victims had been 
removed and stored in vaults of the Reichsbank. He a l so participated 
in the util i zation of concentration camps . Walter Funk was indicated 
on all four counts. 
Erich Raeder had served as Commander-in- Chief of the German 
Navy from 1935 to 1943. It was said that the invasion of Norway was 
the decision of Raeder and not Hitler. He was charged with war 
crimes on the high seas. Raeder was indicted on counts one, two , and 
three. 
Baldur von Schirach was involved in the deportation of Jews from 
Vi enna after he became Gauleiter of Vienna and had been the former 
Reich Youth Leader. He was indicted on counts one and four. 
33 
Albert Speer was the Reich Minister of Arms and Munitions. He 
was the head of all German war production . The court felt that Speer 's 
establishment of blocked industries did keep many l aborers in their 
homes and that in the c l osing stages of the war he was one of the few 
men who had the courage to tell Hitler that the war was lost and to 
take steps to prevent the senseless destruction of production 
fac ilities , both in occupied territories and Germany . He carried 
out his opposition to Hitler ' s scorched earth progr am i n some of the 
Western countries and in Germany by deliberately sabotaging it "at 
consider able per sonal risk." Speer was indicted on all four counts . 
Constantin von Neurath was a Reich Mini ster without Portfolio , 
President of the Secr et Cabinet Council , and a member of the Reich 
Defence Council. He advocated the e l imination of the Czechoslavakian 
intelligentsia and other groups which might resist Germanizati on. 
v~n Neurath was indicted on all four counts. 
:&arl Doenitz was the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy and 
Head of State succeedi ng Hitler. He was charged with waging aggressive 
war and wi th permitt ing the Commando Order to remain in ful l force 
when he became Commander-in- Chief. He was indicted on counts one , 
two , and three. 
Hjalmar Schacht was a banker and world-renowned "prestidigitat or" 
of German finances. He originated the plan that rescued the German 
mark from its worthlessness in 1923 and then a decade l ater suppli ed 
the loans and compl icated financing that made German rearmament 
34 
possible . Justice Jackson said that he was either "a great war 
criminal or ... nothing. " Near the end of the war he had been sent to 
a concentration camp by Hitler. Schacht was indicted on counts one 
and two . 
Franz von Papen was the Vice-Chancellor in the first Hitler 
Cabinet of 1 933 , and later Minister to Vienna and Ambassador to 
Turkey . He was indicted on counts one and two. 
Hans Fritzche had been the Head of the Radio Division of the 
Pro~aganda Ministry and Plenipotentiary for the Pol itical Organization 
of the Greater Germany. He was indicted on counts one, three, and 
four . 
Martin Bormann had served as Head of the Nazi Party Chancell ery 
and Secretary to Hitler . He was involved in the persecution of 
Jews and in furthering the slave labor program. He also transmitted 
instructions allowing the use of firearms and corporal punishment 
on prisoners of war , and was responsible for the lynching of Allied 
Airmen . He was indicted on counts one , three , and four . 
The above information concerning the d efendants was taken from 
the following sources : 
E_ugene Davidson , The Trial of the Germans {The Macmillan 
Company : New York , 1966), pp . 24-27. 
Robert K. Woetzel, The Nlirnberg Trails in International Law 
{Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.: New York, 1960), pp . 7-16 . 
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Following is a chart of the d e fendants , the counts upon which 
they were indicted, and on which they were found guilty . 2 or innocent . 
Count 1 Count 2 Count 3 Count 4 
Goering G G G G 
He ss G G I I 
Bormann I G G 
v on Ribbe ntrop G G G G 
Keitel G G G G 
Kaltenbrunner I G G 
Ro senberg G G G G 
Frank I G G 
Frick - I G G G 
Streicher I G 
Funk I G G G 
Schacht I I 
Doenitz I G G 
Raed e r G G G 
von Schirach I G 
Sau c ke l I I G G 
Jodl G G G G 
von Papen I I 
Seyss-Inquart I G G G 
Speer I I G G 
von Ne urath G G G G 
Fri tzche I G I I 
2 
Ibid., p . xii-xiii . 
II . The Opening Address 
November 21, 1945 
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In order to apply the analysis to the i nventive process of 
Jackson's speeches , the writer returns to Chapter III for the method 
and criteria upon which this study i s based . The logical content , 
val idity, and significance, therefore , will be examined , The first 
endeavor is to identify the ideas; second , to examine their logical 
content and validity ; and third , to evaluate the development and 
significance of the ideas . The following are the ideas and philosophy 
of Jackson as they appear in his opening address . 
Justice Jackson began his opening address by recognizing the 
importance and "grave responsibility" that "the first trial in 
3 
history for crimes against the peace of the world" carried with it. 
He justified the trial by stating that "the wrongs which we seek to 
condemn and punish have been so cal culated , so malignant and so 
devastating , that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored 
4 
because it cannot survive their being repeated . '' 
In a ll of Jackson ' s remarks and justifications of the trial , 
this statement alone had been the greatest . The possibility of 
another aggressive war would pe rhaps have brought total destruction 
to the world . The fear of such a war was truly the main concern of 
the prosecution . 
3 
Ibid ., p. 30. 
4 
Ibid. , p. 30-31 . 
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Jackson also justified the trial being conducted by the four 
victor nations saying "that four great nations, flushed with victory 
and stu_ng with injury stay the hand of vengenance and voluntarily 
submit their captive enemies no the judgment of the law is one of 
5 the most significant tributes that Power ever has paid to Reason . 1' 
The l ogical content and validity of this idea should be obvious to 
all and not only to persons in the l _egal field . 
Logically this was the best approach for Jackson to take in the 
~eginn~ng of his opening address , Throughout the address he gives 
the reasons for the trial, the Tribunal , and the counts of 
indictment explaining and defining each in a chronological and 
justifiable sequence . Although Jackson cited the trial itself as a 
6 significant tribute that ''Power ever had paid to Reason'' , certainly 
his openi_ng address should be included in this tribute. 
Jackson turned next to the definition of the Tribunal . He 
defined it as "nove l and experimental ," but not "the product of 
abstract speculations nor ... created to vindicate legalistic 
theories.'' 
7 
The utilization of International Law concerned with 
aggressive war was a representation of the "practical effort of four 
5 
Ibid., p . 31. 




8 of the most mighty of nations, with the support of seventeen more. " 
For the logic of organi zing the Tribunal , Jackson turned to the 
common sense of mankind: 
"The comnon sense of mankind demands that l aw shall not 
stop with the petty crimes by little people. It must 
also r each men who possess themselves of great power and 
make deliberate and concerted use of it set in motion 
evils which l eave no home in the world untouched. "9 
It was for this reason that Jackson justified the Tribunal and its 
leadership by the victor nations. In truth common sense did 
recognize the top Nazi leaders as t he real war criminals. Jackson at 
one point referred to the law and its precedent over all men, placing 
even t he King under God and the law. 
The consequences of the accuseds ' deeds Jackson found to be 
far-reaching and long lasting. He pointed out that t he significance 
of the inquest 
"was that these prisoners represent sinister influences 
that will lurk in the world l ong after their bodies 
returned to dust . [The prisoners were the] l iving symbols 
of racial hatred, of terrorism and violence, and of the 
arrogance and crue l ty of power ... of fierce nati onalisms 
and of mil itarism, of intrique and war-making which have 
embroiled Europe generation after generation , c r ushing 
its manhood, destroying its homes, and impoverishing its 





Jackson saw a victory for the accused as "an encouragement to all 
the evils which are attached to their names . 1111 The significance 
here is that civilized nations could not allow such deeds to go 
unpunished for fear that they would grow stronger and bring more 
destruction . 
The purpose o f Jackson ' s address is simply stated , giving 
added justification and reason for the trial. "What these men 
stand for we will patiently and temperately disclose, 11 12 He was 
to give "undeniable proof of incredible events . ••
13 
Cataloging the 
crimes Jackson omitted nothing . He appealed not onl y to logic , but 
to emotion as well by discussing the results of the war on the 
German people , Jews , Christians , laborers, and the destruction of 
land and demoralized society that survived . He termed the results 
"the fruits of the sinister forces that sit with [the] defendants 
in the prisoners ' dock . 1114 The development of the effect of the war 
and Jackson's appeal to the emotions is most significant because it 
began his plea for the jury ' s sympathy and verdicts of guilty . 
There were certain limitations and difficulties that left their 
mark on the case . Jackson felt it necessary to define these 
11 Ibid . 
12 






limitations and difficulties in defense of the "nations and the men 
associated in this prosecution . 1115 Some of the important limitations 
and difficulties of the case were cited as: the difficulty of 
bri_nging within " the scope of a single litigation the developments 
of a decade , covering a whole Continent , and invol ving a score of 
nations , countless individuals , and innumerable events ; 1116 ~d the 
limitations caused by the lack of time to research due to the world ' s 
demand for " immediate action. 11 17 This concern for the difficulties 
and limitations by J ackson was to make all those involved aware of 
the attempt being made by the prosecution to exercise justice and 
fairness while at the same time recognizing that they were only 
human and succeptible to error. 
In regard to the dudgment made by the victor nations , Jackson 
remarked , "We must never forget that the record on which we judge 
these defendants today is the record on which history will judge us 
18 
tomorrow . " The significance of this statement is that the trial 
is not important just for the moment, but that it would serve as a 
corner stone for all such crimes and trials of this nature to be 
held thereafter . The Nilrnberg trial would serve as a guide for 
international law and i nternational judgment and history would be 
the judge of the success and impact of the trial. 
15 Ibid . 
16 Ibid . 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., p. 33-34 . 
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To reenforce the decision to hold the trial Justice Jackson 
presented the a lternatives that were possible . Through the use of 
rhetorical questions he shows t hat the o nly course of action was 
that of an international trial . He then proceeded to justify t he 
Tribunal . Using his appeal to logic he stated, ''Realistically , the 
Charter of this Tribunal , which gives [the defendants] a hearing , 
is also their only hope. 11 19 Here again his logic is mixed with 
emotion as he made the act of the Tribunal appear to be a personal 
favor to the defendants. The significance h e wished to bring out is 
that although these defendants were unjust and unfair to t heir enemi e s , 
the Tribunal was magnanimous enough to afford them the opportunity 
to receive the justice and fairness that they were unwilling to 
give . The guilt of the accused involved "moral as well a s legal 
20 
wrong" and the Tribunal i ntended to prove all the counts of 
21 
indictment "by books and records . " From this Jackson implied that 
in no way could anyone logically find the defendants not guilty . 
J ackson focused on the guilt of the defendants and denied the 
collective guilt of the German people . Albert Speer in his memoirs 
wrote , 
19 
Ibid. , 34 . p . 
20 Ibid. 35. __ , p. 
21 Ibid . 
"The trial began with the grand, devastating opening 
address by the Chief American prosecutor, Justice Robert 
H. Jackson. But I took comfort from one sentence in it 
which accused the defendants of guil t for the regime ' s 
crimes, but not the German people. This thesis 
corresponded precisely with what I had hoped would be a 
subsidiary result of the trial: that the hatred directed 
against the German people which had been fanned by the 
propaganda of the war years and had reached an extreme 
after the revelation of those crimes, would now be 
focused upon us, the defendants. 1122 
42 
Jackson ' s statement was: "We woul d also make clear that we have no 
23 
purpose to incriminate the whole German people . " It was true that 
the German people had suffered and could not help but bear the 
burden of guilt. Jackson went on to explain, "The German people 
should know by now that the people of the United States hold them in 
no fear , and in no hate. 11 24 The denial of collective guilt was a 
significant factor of the trial and was a major element that many 
had hoped would be part of the outcome. Here again, it was only 
logical to condemn those of high command because singly they 
organized and controll ed all that happened. 
Referring to what he called "the Nazi nightmar e ," Jackson said, 
"The Nazi nightmare has given the German name a new and sinister 
22 
Speer, op. cit., p. 520. 
23 Jackson, The Niirnberg Case , p. 35. 
24 Ibid. 
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significance thr~ughout the world whic h will retard Germany a 
. 25 
century." The l ogic and validity of this statement would in time 
prove to be untrue . Alth~ugh it was a powerful and seemingly 
significant statement during his opening address history was to prove 
him wrong . Albert Speer also comment ed on this statement appeari_ng 
to be more l _ogical in his ideas and more valid in h is reasoning. He 
attributed the "criminal events of those years " to two elements ; 
an ou_tgrowth of Hitler' s personality and the implementation o f 
26 
technol _ogy . Jackson felt that the major element was the attempt 
to form a "master race. 11 27 Speer ' s r easoni _ng about future destruction 
a nd danger in all nations was that it would not be a threat from 
Germany , but the threat of technology : 
"The more technol ogical the world becomes, the greater is 
the danger .... A new great war will end with the 
destruction of human culture and c ivilization . There is 
nothing to stop unleashed technology and sci ence from 
completing its work of destroying man which it has so 
terribly begun in this war . . . . 11 28 
Speer also saw this nightmare as that of the future, not the past: 
25 
Ibid ., p . 36 . 
26 
Speer, op . cit., p . 521 . 
27 Jackson , The Nurnberg Case , p. 36. 
28 Speer, loc. cit . 
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"The nightmare shared by many people that some day the nations of 
the· world may be dominated by technology .. . Therefore, the more 
technological the world becomes , the more essential will be the 
demand for individual freedom and the self-awareness of the 
individual human being as a counterpoise to technology. 1129 The 
preceding statements from Speer were taken from his cross-examination 
by Justice Jackson . On this point J ackson clearly loses. 
Jackson ' s method of delivering his opening address was to 
return to the specifi c purpose of the trial throughout his message . 
He thus far has discussed responsibilities , "justifications , the 
Tirbunal, fairness , and the trial' s limitations returning always to 
the purpose and terrible crimes for reenforcement of his case . In 
the continuing segments of the address he gives a chronological 
overview of the war and development of the Nazi Party again inserting 
the purpose and destruction that occurred . The following is a 
chronological listing of Jackson ' s ideas as they appear in the next 
section of his opening address . 
In discussing the central theme of the case Jackson dealt with 
the following points : 
The Fact and the course of war is history. 
Beginning Sept. 1, 1 939 , Germans overran many countries . 
29 
Speer , l oc . cit. 
Those countries included: Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands, 
France , Belgium, Luxembourg, the Balkans, Poland, the Baltic 
States, and parts of Russia. 
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The war did not just happen - it was planned and prepared. 
The defendants all united with the Nazi Party in a plan which 
they well knew could be accomplished only by an outbreak of 
war in Europe. 
The offices and officials were dedicated to criminal purposes 
and committed to use criminal methods. 
Jackson's purpose was to open the case by dealing with the 
common plan or conspiracy to achieve ends possible only by 
resorting crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity. 
The case was concerned with the brains and authority 
responsible for all the crimes. 
At this point Jackson took up the subject of the lawless road 
to power in which he discussed the following historical records: 
The chief instrumentality of cohension in plan and action 
was the National Socialist German Workers Party, known as 
the Nazi Party. 
Adolf Hitler became the supreme leader, known as the Fuhrer, 
in 1921. 
February 24, 1920, at Munich, the Nazi Party publicly 
proclaimed its program. 
The proclamation carried with it certain commendable demands 
such as, profit-sharing in the great industries, general 
development of provision for old age, creation and 
maintenance of a healthy middle class, a land reform suitable 
to national requirements, and raising the standard of health. 
There was also a demand for loyalty and patriotism. 
The Nazi Party from its inception contemplated war putting 
together the necessary organizations. 
The Nazi Party also declared that no Jew or any person of 
non-German blood could be a member of the nation. 
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The Party promised an authoritarian and totalitarian program 
for Germany. 
Restrictions were placed on education, the press, publications , 
and religion. 
The Party platform read: "The leaders of the Nazi Party swear 
to proceed regardless of consequences-if necessary, at the 
sacrifice of their lives. 
Jackson now switched to the fulfillment of the party pledge 
which entailed enumeration of the following points : 
The foreign objectives were to undo international treaties 
and to wrest territory from foreign control , as well as 
most of their internal program. 
The first effort was to subvert the Weimar Republi c by 
violent revolution. 
This effort fail ed and the Nazi Party turned to plans 
for its capture. 
J ackson next elaborated on the Nazi Party structure comprising 
the historical chronol ogy of the Nazi organization as follows: 
The Nazi Party, under the Fuhrerprinzip , was bound by an 
iron discipline into a pyramid , with the Fuhrer, of 
Adolf Hitler, at the top. 
The structure then broadened into numerous Leadership Corps : 
Die sturmabteilungen (SA), Die Schutzstaffeln (SS), Der 
Sicherheitsdienst (SD) , and Die Geheime Staatspolizei 
(Gestapo). 
The Nazi Party had its own source of law, courts, and police. 
The chain of command was military. 
Adolf Hitl er became Chancellor of the German Republic on 
January 30 , 1933. 
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The manner in which the Nazi power was consolidated was of 
obvious significance and Jackson elaborated the following points in 
this connection: 
This consolidation and the steps involved embraced the most 
hideous of crimes against humanity. 
This consolidation was used as a means of perfecting control 
of the German state. 
The Nazi program was recognized by other nations as a 
desperate program for a people still suffering the effects 
of an unsuccessful war. 
During this period there appeared to be two governments 
existing in Germany - the real and the ostensible; the 
German Republic form and the Leadership Corps of the Nazi 
Party. 
On February 27 , 1933 the Reichstag building was set on 
fire, it had been the symbol of free parliamentary 
government and the Nazis were believed to have staged 
the fire. 
The Nazis accused the Communist Party of the crime. 
On February 28, 1933 Hitler obtained a decree from President 
von Hindenburg suspending the guarantees of individual 
liberty contained in the Constitution of the Weimar Republic. 
Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 , and 153 were suspended. 
These articles that had given Germans certain rights included: 
deprivation of personal freedom by a public authority ; the 
right of every German ' s home as his sanctuary , the secrecy of 
letters, and a ll postal, telegraphic and telephonic 
communications; freedom to express opinions in speech , i n 
writing, in print, in picture form or in any other way; the 
right to assemble peacefully and unarmed without giving notice 
and special permission; the right to form associations or 
societies for purposes not contrary to criminal law; and 
property was guaranteed by the Constitution.* 
* (Note: The Constitution itself authorized von Hindenberg to 
temporarily suspend these fundamental rights "if the public safety and 
order in the German Reich are considerably disturbed or endangered.") 
This decree had no provisions for restoring these rights 
leaving the Nazi policy and party formations completely 
unrestrained and irresponsible. 
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This enabled the Nazis to carry out their battles for complete 
domination, 
The Nazis focused their persecution upon certain elements of 
society among which were representative of the working class. This 
section of his speech enumerated these Nazi efforts: 
When Hitler came into power , there were three groups of trade 
unions in Germany: the General German Trade Union 
Confederation (ADBG), the General Independent Employees 
Confederation (AFA), and the Christian Trade Union. 
The working class had little to gain by war and would not 
support the war efforts. 
The Nazis required that the working people be stripped of 
power and whipped into new and unheard-of sacrifices as 
part of the Nazi war preparation. 
The Nazi Party issued an order for attacks on the ADGB and 
the AFA. The SA and the SS organizations were to take union 
properties and to take into custody persons who came into 
question. 
They began to carry out these orders on May 2, 1933. The 
confiscation was done by the Deutsche Arbeitsfront (Labor 
Front). 
On May 19, 1933 , by government decree "trustees" of labor, 
appointed by Hitler, should regulate the conditions of all 
labor contracts, replacing the process of collective 
bargaining. 
Not only did the Nazis dominate and regiment German labor, 
but they forced the youth into the ranks of the laboring 
people. 
Jackson commented, "Robert Ley , the field marshal of the 
battle against labor , answered our indictment with suicide. 
Apparently he knew no better answer." 
The next social element singled out for persecution was 
religion and this signaled the battle against the churches: 
The Nazi Party a l ways was predominantly anti-Christian in 
its ideology. 
The Nazis' crime was not in that they were pagan in their 
own beliefs, but because they persecuted others of the 
Christian faith. 
Religious sects such as, Jehovah's Witnesses and the 
Penecostal Association were persecuted. 
A most intense drive was directed against the Roman Catholic 
Church. 
After the occupation of foreign soil, these persecutions 
went on with greater vigor than ever. 
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The Nazi crimes against the Jews aroused more notoriety than 
any of the other Nazi efforts at persecution. Jackson proceeded to 
elaborate these crimes: 
The most savage and numerous crimes planned and committed 
by the Nazis were those against the Jews. 
The Jews in Germany, in 1933, numbered about 500,000. 
The crimes against the Jews incl uded: expropriation of 
Jewish property , discriminations against the Jewish 
religion, placement of impediments in the way of success 
in economic life, organized mass violence against Jews, 
physical isolation in the ghettos, deportation , forced 
labor, mass starvation, and extermination. 
The avowed purpose was the destruction of the Jewish people 
as a whole, as an end in itself , as a measure of preparation 
for war, and as a discipline of conquered peoples. 
Jackson commented, "History does not record a crime ever 
perpetrated against so many victims or one ever carried 
out with such calculated cruelty." 
On February 24, 1942, Hitler proclaimed that "the Jew will 
be exterminated. " 
Under the Niirnberg decrees of Sept. 15 , 1935 , the SD was 
made responsible for the guardianship of the J ews. 
On November 10 , 1938, an order was given for all Jewish 
synagogues to be blown up or set fire. This was later 
called the "Kristallnacht" or the night Jewish property 
was plundered and churches burned . 
Following this attack Jews were sent to concentration camps. 
Jackson then presented official German doc\.Ullents that gave 
detailed reports of their actions against the Jews . 
In keeping with a comprehensive coverage of Nazi criminal 
actions Jackson reported historical data revealing the terrorism 
and preparation for war: 
The German mistreatment of Germans is now known (at the 
time of the trial) to pass in magnitude and savagery any 
limits of what is tolerable by modern civilization. 
The purpose of getting rid of the influence of free labor , 
the churches, and the Jews was to clear their obstruction 
to the precipitation of aggressive war. 
Terrorism was the chief instrlllllent for securing the cohesion 
of the German people in war purposes. 
Concentration camps were opened a l l over Germany . 
Beatings, starvings, tortures, and killings became routine. 
Deportations and secret arrest were labeled "Nacht und 
Nebel" (Night and Fog. ) 
The victims of concentration camps were used for cruel 
and inhumane scientific experiments . 
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Gennany became a vast torture chamber. 
Financiers, economists, industrialists joined in planning 
and promoting elaborate alterations in industry and finance 
to support an unprecedented concentration of resources 
and energies upon preparations for war. 
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The period during which the German government t ested the will 
of the Allies , was seen by Jackson as a scheme of experiments in 
aggression : 
The Nazis advanced only as others yielded keeping in a 
position to drawback if they found persistence to be 
dangerous before resorting to open aggressive warfare. 
On March 7 , 1936 , the Nazis reoccupied the Rhineland. 
On March 12, 1936 , they began the invasion of Austria. 
On March 15, 1939 , the Nazis seized Bohemia and Moravia. 
At this point , Jackson interrupts his chronological report 
stating that he "will not prolong this address by detailing the steps 
leading to the war of aggression which began with Poland on September 
1 , 1939. The further story will be unfolded to you from documents 
including those of the German High Command itself . 11 30 These documents 
3o Jackson, The Nurnberg Case, p. 68. 
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did indeed prove that the war was a planned war of aggr ession , 
Jackson reminded the jury that "even the most warlike peopl es 
have recognized .. . some limitations on the savagery of warfare'.' and 
that "rules to that end have been embodied in international 
conventi ons to which Germany became a party . 1131 The code had 
prescribed certain restraints as to warlike treatment , Once again 
Jackson justified the international trial by show0g that Germany 
had not uphe ld an interna tional agreement. 
The Nazi treatment of their enemy forces could not have been 
stated more c l early than in a letter written February 28 , 1942 by 
Rosenberg to Keitel. The letter stated , "The fate of the Soviet 
prisoners of war in Germany is on the contrary a tragedy of the 
32 greatest extent . 1' This letter Jackson submitted as evidence on 
behalf of the prosecution - a logical choice of evidence as well as 
a significant one . 
The Prosecutor returned to the horrible crimes and the ruthl ess 
manner in which they were committed . He seemed to linger 
unnecessarily long on these matters . Although he occasionally 
commented on not going into detailed a ccounts , he did so frequently . 
31 
Ibid. , p . 73. 
32 Ibid . , p . 74 . 
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His r easoning is obvious , merely for reenforcement and to point the 
most tragic of a ll portraits of the wa r . He a lso a ccused numerous 
defendants of specific crimes and supported his accusations with 
documents written by the defendants . Realizing this Jackson 
r emarked: 
"I shall not go into further details of the war crimes 
and crimes against humanity committed by the Nazi 
ganster ring whose leaders are b efor e you . It is not 
the purpose in my part of this case to deal with the 
individual crimes .. .. My task is only to show the 
scale on which these crimes occurred , and to show 
that these are the men who were in the responsible 
positions and who conceived the plan and des ign which 
renders them answerable, regardless of the fact that 
the plan was actually executed by others . 1133 
This he acco~plished and more . 
With the chronological review finished Jackson then turned to 
the law of the case . He began by asking the question , "Is the re no 
standard in the law for a deliberate and reasoned judgment on such 
conduct? 1134 He then proceeded to answer the question beginning 
with an e xplanation of the legal philosophy of the Charter of t h e 
tribunal . The Charter was not only an agreement by the four 
victorious nations , but of "twenty-one governments , representing an 
33 Ibid., p . 79 . 
34 Ibid . 80 I p • • 
54 
overwhe lming majority of all civilized nations . 11 35 Jackson , along 
with his colle_agues , also rec_ognized that this "decl aration of the 
law1136 was not decl ared at the time the defendants enacted the crimes 
maki_ng the declaration somewhat of a shock to the defendants . He 
stated, however , that '' their pr_ogram defied ~ l aws , 11 3~ and he 
cited statements and documents by the High Command and the defendants 
in which they openly stated that they were defying the law because 
it did not adhere to their purposes . These statements and documents 
were definitely helpful to the prosecution. The prosecution knew 
that anything it would say or accusations that i t would make would 
only be valid if they could present concrete evidence to support 
them - and this they did. 
Jackson went on to explain the counts of indictment which have 
already been listed at the beginning of this chapter. 
The principle that war is unjust and illegal can be found in 
many documents, pacts, and agreements among nations . Some of these 
include such significant charters a s the Briand~Kell_ogg Pact, 1928; 
the Geneva Protocal of 1924; the Eighth Assembly by the League of 
Nations in 1927; and the Sixth Pan American Conference of 1928 . 38 
35 Ibid . 
36 I bid. 
-- I p. 81. 
37 Ibid . 
38 Ibid . 
-- I p . 84 . 
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All of the meetings recognized wars of aggression as an interna t ional 
crime. With such documents as these already established the Chart er 
of the Tribunal was not creati ng a new law, but in actuality carrying 
out a law already adopted by the c ivilized nations . Once more 
Jackson ' s justification of the Tribunal was strengthened. 
I n the foll owi ng section much of Jackson's own ph i l osophy 
seeps through as he attempts to interpret and expl a i n international 
law. He admitted that there was no judicial pr ecedent f or the Charter 
but that "he was not disturbed by the l ack of judi cial precedent 
for the injury Ithe pr osecution proposed] to conduct. 11 39 He made 
these comments about international law to substantiate his l ack of 
concern for judicial precedent. 
"International law .. . is an outgrowth of treati es and 
agreements between nations and of accepted customs ... 
[It] is not capabl e of development by the normal 
processes of l egis l ation for there is no continuing 
international legislative authority .. .. It g r ows , as did 
the Common Law, through decisions reached from time to 
time i n adapting settl ed principles to new s ituations . 
The fact is that when the law e vol ves by the case 
method . . . it advances at the expense of those who wrongly 
guessed the law and learned too l ate their error .. .. the 
events I have earlier recited clearly fall within the 
s t andards of crimes, ... whose perpetrators this Tribunal 
is convened to judge and punish f i ttingl y 11 • 40 
Again more justification for his case. 
39 Ibid., p. 85. 
4o Ibid. 
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Pointing out certain problems and weaknesses of the Charter, 
Jackson discussed i ts fail ure to define a war of aggression as a 
maj or oversight . For his definition o f a war of aggression , Jackson 
used the Convention for the Definition of Aggression signed at London 
on July 3, 1933 , one of the most authoritative sources of International 
Law on the subject . · He listed the four acts of that definition 
and one of his own as the criteria for defining a war of aggression 
for the purposes of this case . He concluded the matter with thi s 
statement , "It is upon such an understanding of the law that our 
evidence of a conspi racy to provoke a nd wage an agressive war is 
prepared and presented . 1141 
Another problem that Jackson felt could have prolonged the trial 
was that the position held by the Tribunal and the German state on 
the conditions causing the war differed . To avoid such a problem 
or extension of the trial he made c l ear the concern of the Tribunal . 
The cause of the war he said was for "history to unravel . 1142 The 
concern of the prosecution was ''that whatever grievances a nation 
may have .. . aggressive warfare is an i llegal means of settling those 
grievances or for altering those conditions . 1143 
41 Ibid, p . 87 . 
42 Ibid . 
43 Ibid . 
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The Charter amidst its problems and weaknesses did r ecognize 
the law of individual responsibility . The individual responsibility 
was directed toward those who corranitted "acts defined as crimes , or 
who [incited] others to do so , or who [joined] a common plan with 
other· persoris ,_ groups, or organi zations to bring about their 
commission . 11 44 The Charter also stated that "one who has committed 
criminal acts may not take refuge in superior orders nor in the 
doctrine that his crimes were acts of states . ,,45 If this had been 
permi ssabl e all of the defendants could have used that doctrine . As 
in all events , however , the chart e r realized that under certain 
circumstances a person cannot be held responsibl e for his actions, 
but the defendants were not among those exceptions. All of the 
defendants had p l ayed major roles in the war and were responsible 
for their actions . To further justify the Tribunal making clear 
that their Charter was not solely c r eated for this trial , but in 
effect a compilation of laws enforced by a ll the individual nations 
he remarked . "Every day in the courts of countri es associated in 
this prosecution , men are convicted for acts that they did not 
personally commit but for which they were held responsible because of 
. . ,,46 membership in illegal combinations or plans or conspiracies . 
44 
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Jackson also pointed out to the jury that by rendering a verdict of 
guilty _against the o_rganizations it "will render prima facie guilt 
for thousands upon thousands of me mbers now in custody of the United 
d h . ,,47 States forces an ot er armies , 
The ~ogical approach for Jackson to take in e nding his opening 
address was to remind the bench how all that he had said was 
applicable to the case - and this he did. He complete d the circle 
by return~ng to the Tribunal and its responsibility . The great 
importance and significance of the trial are stated throughout his 
address , but he felt it necessary to bri ng the matter to the bench ' s 
attention in his conclusion as well. He described the court as 
" the first court ever to undertake the difficult task o f overcoming 
the confus i on of many tongues and t h e conflicting concepts of jus t 
procedure among diverse systems of law, so as to reach a common 
judgment. 1148 
In summing up Jackson intertwined emotion with logic and tried 
to make the United States appear more than fair in its participation , 
He pointed out that " the United States is perhaps in a position to 
be most dispassionate, for having sustained the least injury , it is 
49 
the least animated by vengeance . 11 While the United States had 
47 Ibid., p . 91. 
48 
Ibid. 
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sustained the least injury it was acknowledged by Jackson that 
"twice in my lifetime , the United States has sent its young manhood 
across the Atlantic , drained its r esources , and burdened itself 
with debt to help defeat Gerrnany . 11 50 He contined , " the United States 
cannot ,. generation after generation , throw its youth or its resources 
onto the battlefields of Europe to redress the lack of bal ance b e tween 
Germany ' s str ength and that of her enemies , and to keep the battles 
from our shores . 1151 The possibility that another such war could 
take p l ace makes the importance of this trial even more significant, 
This was what Jackson wanted; not onl y for the judgments to be 
guilty for the defendants of this trial , but to remind others 
contemplating a similar war of aggression of the consequences that 
they too would have to face . 
Al though making this point Jackson was "aware of the weaknesses 
of juridical action alone to contend that in itself [the) decision 
52 under this Charter [cannot] prevent future wars . 1' There could 
only be hope that it would do so . His sense of fairness and equal 
j ustice for a ll was evident as he made c l ear to all concerned "that 
while t his law first applied against German aggressor s .. • and if it 
so Ibid. , p . 92 . 
51 Ibid . 
52 Ibid . 
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is to serve a useful purpose .,. must condemn aggression by any 
other nations, includi_ng those [who sat in judgment] , 1153 
Jackson saw the trial as a representation of "mankind's 
desperate effort to apply the discipline of the law to statesmen 
who have used their powers of stat e to attack the foundati ons o f 
the world ' s peace and t o commit aggression against the rights of 
their ne_ighbors. 1154 He also envisione d the trial as a ''part of the 
55 great effort to make the peace more secure ," These remarks would 
only be valid if the j udgments reached were in favor of the 
prosecution . 
A final appeal by Jackson was made in the name of Civilization , 
His concluding words were very powerful and moving , placing the case 
in the hands of the jury . All of his logic , justification, a nd 
significance were for the last time put into words : "Civilization 
. .. does not expect that you can make war impossibl e . It does not 
expect that your j uridical action will put the forces of Inter~ 
national Law , its precepts , its prohibitions and , most of all , its 
sanctions , on the side of peace , so that men and women of good will 
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I n giving a fina l analysis the writer quotes Lord Shawcross, 
during the time of the Nuremberg ( s i c ) Trial Lord Shawcross was 
known as Sir Hartley , the Chief British Prosecutor, who i n 
commenti_ng on Justice Jackson I s Openi_ng Addre~s remarked , "None 
of the arts of the actor [were] here . This [was] no dramat ic 
declamation , but calmly in words of dignity and authority the 
demand of a lawyer and statesman too that law and justice shoul d 
in t he end prevail. 11 57 
III . The Closing Address 
July 26 , 1946 
July 26 , 1946, Justice Robert H. Jackson delivered his closing 
address to the Niirnberg Tribunal at the Palace of Justice, Niirnberg , 
Germany. As in any closing statement , he surrunarized all that had 
taken place during the eight months of the trial. 
Explaining what had taken place Jackson stated , "We have 
introduced evidence which embraces as vast and varied a panorama 
of events as ever has been compressed within the framework of a 
litigation. 1158 With this statement he wanted to remind the Tribunal 
57 
Desmond , Freund , Stewar~, and Shawcross , op . ci t. , p . 125 . 
58 Jackson, The Nurnberg Case , p. 120. 
62 
that this was not an ordinary trial nor were the events leadi_ng to 
the trial ordinary ones . 'I'he rec_ognition of these factors were: 
most important to J ustice Jackson ' s summation . 
Jackson also re~ognized the limitations of his Closing Address, 
He remarked , " It is impossible in summation to do more than outline 
with bold strokes the vital s of this trial ' s mad a nd melancholy 
record , which will l ive as the historical text of the twentieth 
century's s hame and depr avi ty , 11 59 The jury had the facts and 
documents before them if needed Jackson's responsibility was not 
to recreate al l that had happened , but to concl ude the case for 
prosecution in this last appeal to the jury. 
Throughout Jackson ' s Opening Address he had br~ught out the 
significance of the trial and the impact that it was to have o n 
history, He too , in his Closing Address again commented on the 
trial ' s historical effect . Jackson had concluded his Opening Address 
with a plea for the rise of civilization and not its fall . He also 
opened his Closing Address with this same plea : "The deeds are the 
overshadowing historical facts by which g enerations to come will 
remember this decade . If we cannot eliminate the causes and prevent 
the repetition of these barbaric events, it is not an irresponsible 
59 Ibid . 
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prophecy to say that this twentieth century may yet succeed in 
. . th d f · · 1 · · u 60 bring~ng e oom o civi ization , Jackson saw that a long 
range effect of the tria l had been to persuade the bench of its 
responsibility to posterity and to possible future trials of this 
kind . 
Jackson felt it necessary to mention the law of the case in h i s 
summation , but only to mention it , not to dwell o n the matter. He 
said , ''I shall not labor the l aw of the case . The · pos ition of t h e 
United States was explained in my opening statement , 1161 The main 
point that he did bring out , however, was that a l t hough the 
defendants had asked for the legal basis of the trial to be 
nullified this could not be adhered to because the Tribunal did not 
have the power to set aside or to modify the Agreement that had been 
made among the four victor nations and eighteen others , 62 One o f 
the reasons for the defendants' plea for the denouncement of the 
law Jackson believed was based on the premise that a ny man who has 
been held accountabl e for a crime by the law does not have a good 
opinion of it . Germany had uncondi tionally surrendered and 
technically the Allies were still in a state of war with Germany . 
The Military Tribunal · in effect was a continuation of the war effort 
60 Ibid . 
61 Ibid., p . 121. 
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by the Allied nations. As a result the "Internati o n a l Tribunal 
[was] not b ound by the procedural a nd substantial refinements of 
our respective judicial and constitutiona l systems , nor [did] its 
rulings introduce precedents into a ny country's internal civil 
63 
system of justice" 
The Charter itself was not the only significant accomplishment 
of the nations involved; J ackson called the International Military 
Tribunal a ''unique and emergent character of this b ody" which should 
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not be overlooked. By drawing attention to this Jac kson had 
placed t he bulk of the r esponsibility of the proceedings on the 
Tribunal. He told the Tribunal that they must "[seek] guidance not 
only from the I nternational Law but a l so from the b asic principl es 
of jurisprudence which are assumptions of c i vilizatio n and which 
l~ng have found embodiment in the codes o f all nations . 11 65 
Referr~ng to justice for the defendants , Jackson stated that , 
"History will know that whatever could be said, [the Nazis ] were 
allowed to say . They have been given the kind of trial which they, 
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in the days of their p omp and power, never gave to any man ," He 
tried to impress upon the Tribunal t h e significance of the power 
nations ' quest for a f air trial for the defendants . He cited this 
63 Ibid. , p . 122 . 
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greatness of the Four Powers to be one of the elements that made 
the m great : " .• . fairness is not weakness , The extraordinary fairness 
of [the ] hear0gs [was ] an attribute of our strength. 11 67 He pointed 
out that even though the prosecution had given the defendants ever y 
possible opportunity to prove their innocence they were not able 
to do so . "The fact is," he had s a i d , "that the testimony of the 
defendants has removed any doubts of guilt which , •. may have existed 
68 
before they spoke ." 
Because of the defendant ' s own testimonies and the conclusive 
evidence presented in the cases against them , the weight of passing 
judgment was made easier to bear for the Tribunal. Jackson 
remarked , "They have helped write their own judgment by 
condemnation . 11 69 The only reason the court had studie d the Nazi 
war tactics was because "their creed and teachings [were] important 
1 . d f . k 1 d d · ,,
7o on y as evi ence o motive, purpose , now e ge, an intent . 
This study had been necessary in order for the prosecution to present 
to the Tribunal a clear cut case which could be proven, not only by 








70 Ibid . , p. 123 . 
An admitted weakness , as Jackson pointed out , was that the 
"world had failed to provide political or lega l remedies which 
71 
66 
would be honorable and acceptible alternatives to war ." However 
strong this factor was it still did not excuse the Nazis of their 
crimes . Any civilized country should have been capable of using a 
more r easonable method for obtaining their goals than that of 
~ggressive warfare he b e lieved. 
Jackson emphasized the fact that , "The United States [had] 
no interest which would be advanced by the conviction of any 
defendant if we have no t proved hi~ guilty on at least one of the 
counts charged against him in the Indictment. 1172 He did not see a n 
unjust verdict as a victory for the prosecution . 
Lawyers often refer to their cases as an open and shut case , 
In the following statements of Jackson 1 s address he found this to 
be s u ch a case : " . .. in swmnation we now have before us the tested 
evidences of criminality and have heard the flimsy excuses and 
paltry evasions of the defendants , The suspended judgment with 
which we opened this case i s no longer appropriate , The time has 
come for final judgment and if the case I present seems hard and 
. . . th . d . 73 uncompromising , 1.t 1.s because e evi ence makes 1.t so . " The 
writer r eviewing the case a l so saw the case as ' open and shut' and 
agreed with Jackson, 
71 Ibid . 
72 
Ibid . 
73 Ibid , 
67 
Jackson ' s next step was to discuss the case impressively , but 
simpl y . He saw the specifics of the case as being "diplomacy , 
naval development and warfare , land warfare , the genesis of air 
warfa re, the politics of the Nazi rise to powe r , the finance and 
economics of totalitaria n war , sociol ogy , penology , mass psychology, 
and mass pathology. 11 74 The discussion of these specifi c s h e would 
leave " to e xpe rts to comb the evidence and write volumes on their 
speci a lties : '.' 75 His intention in thi s secti on was to "picture in 
broad strokes the offenses whose acceptance as lawful would threaten 
the continuity of civilization. 1176 Quoting Kipling he d escr ibed his 
attempt as a " splash at a ten~league canvas with brushes of comet's 
h 
. ,, 7 7 
air . J ackson's began with a diagram of the crimes o f 
the Nazi r _egime . One significant point emphasized that the case 
was against the Nazi regime and not the German p e ople as a whole . 
It included the Crimes of the Nazi Regime : 
The seizure of power and subjugation of Germany to a 
police state . 
The preparation and waging of wars of aggression. 
74 







The warfare in disregard of international law. 
The enslavement and plunde r of populations in organized 
countries . 
The persecution and exte rmination of Jews and Christians . 
68 
Following this discussion Jackson went on to the central crimes ; 
an admitted war of aggression: 
The war of aggression did take place . 
From the moment the Nazis came to power, eve ry member had 
worked to prepare for war . 
In outlining these crimes Jackson directed the court ' s attention 
to the defendants sayi.ng that "a glance over the dock will show that 
despite quarrel s among themselves , each defendant played a part 
which fitted in with every other, and that all advanced the common 
1 ,,78 pan. Jackson followed with a brief run down on the defendants 
and their major involvement in the criminal events . This part of 
his Clos~ng Address was primarily a review of the statements he had 
made in his opening remarks . By repeating them in the summation he 
hoped to refresh the jury's memory on the cruelty, injustice , and 
inhumane treatment administered by the defendants and the 
organizations on trial . 
78 Ibid . __ , p. 141. 
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Nearing the close of his address , Jackson found it necessary 
to examine the charges of responsibility against the defendants . 
He felt that these charges could be reviewed on the basis of 
common responsibility , not individual r esponsibility. The defendants' 
answers to these charges he listed as : 1) admission of limited 
responsibility; 2 ) putting the blame on others ; and 3) admiss ion of 
h h . . l 79 the crimes , butt at t ere were no crl.ffiina s. 
The defendants denied the charge of conspiracy stati_ng that the 
Nazi plan was a common plan , not a conspiracy . Jackso n pointed out , 
however , that "the Charter concept of a common plan really represents 
80 
the conspiracy principle in an international context ." To contest 
this charge further , the defendants said that there was no conspiracy 
involving aggressive war for the following reasons : 
"l) none of the Nazis wanted war; 2) rearamament was only 
intended to provide the strength to make Germany ' s voice 
heard in the family of nations ; and 3) the wars were not 
in fact aggressive wars but were defensive against a 
'Bolshevik menace '. 11 81 
In proving that these statements were false Jackson referred 
to documents and testimonies by the defendants which did not back 
up their denial of conspiracy charges . Comments such as , "To be 
sure we were building guns . But not to shoot. They were only to 
79 Ibid . 147 , p . . 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. , p . 148 . 
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, , I 82 , 
give us we_ight in negotiating. ' were used . Logically, Jackson 
did not need to continue his defense on this charge - he had clearly 
proved thei~ guilt. 
The ch~rge of waging an ~ggressive war was Jackson's next 
concern . The defendants had .3:rgued that the "wars were not aggressive 
and were only intended to protect Germany against some eventual 
danger from the 'menace of Corru:nunism' • 11 83 This Jackson turned their 
84 
" argument of self-defense" sayipg that certain "facts clearly 
85 
established in the record" made their argument invalid . He cited 
these facts as 1) the enormous and rapid German preparations for 
war ; 2) the repeatedl y avowed intentions of the German leaders to 
attack ; and 3) the fact that a series of wars occurre d in which 
German forces struck the first blow , without warning, across the 
. 86 f borders of other nations . Obviously , these acts aided the 
prosecution and Jackson proved guilt on the second charge . He said, 
"In all the documents which disclose the planning and rationalization 
of these attacks , not one sentence has been or can be cited to show 
87 
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87 Ibid ., 150 . p . 
The defense had tried to prove that the defendants had no 
alternatives to their actions because they were under the power 
and rule of a dictator . Jackson was quick in reacti ng on this 
point. He reminded the court that 
" the defendants may have becane slaves of a dictator, 
but he was their dictator. To make him such was , as 
Goring [had] testified, the object of the Nazi movement 
from the beginning . 11 88 
Here again Jackson documented and proved the defendants ' guilt. 
For additional reenforcement J ackson asked to be allowed to 
"turn devi l ' s advocate 11 89 for a moment . He said , 
" I admit that Hitler was the chief villain. But for 
the defendants to put all blame on him is neither 
manl y nor true. we know that even the head of state 
has the same limits to his senses and to the hours of 
his day as do lesser men. He must rely on others to be 
his eyes and ears as to most t hat goes on in a great 
empire. Other legs must run his errands; other hands 
must execute his plans. On whom did Hitler rel y more 
than upon these men in the dock? 11 90 
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With this question he encompassed the whole of the trail and placed 
the answer directly in the hands of the jury. 
The worth of the defendants' testimonies was al so questioned 
by Jackson. He drew attention to contradictory remarks in their 
88 Ibid. , p . 152. 
89 Ibid., p. 160. 
9o Ibid. 
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individual testimonies which discredited their validity and 
importance . "We have presented to this Tribunal an affinnative 
case based on incriminating documents which are sufficient .. . to 
r equir e a finding of guilt on count one against each defendant , 11 91 
he said. 
Jackson concluded , 
"In opening this case I ventured to predict that there 
would be no serious denial that the crimes charged 
were committed and that the i ssue would concern the 
r esponsibili ty of particular defendants. 11 92 "The 
defendants now ask this Tribunal, " be continued , "to 
say that they are not gui lty of planning , executing , 
or conspiring to comnit this long list of crimes and 
wrongs .... If you were to say of these men that they 
are not guilty , it would be as true to say there has 
been no war, there are no s lain, there has been no 
crime. 11 93 
His responsibility had been fulfilled and his commitment to the 
Nurnberg trial had ended. 
Returning to Lord Shawcross ' l ecture on Jackson during the 
Nurnberg trial , he a l so referred to the Cl osing Address . Lord 
Shawcross remarked , 
" It was not a long speech. It was a speech illuminated 
by humanity, clearl y and vivi dly illustrati ng the crimes 
that had been committed , the rule of law which was to be 
vindicated. It was a speech that no one who heard it 
will forget: a speech which future historians and statesmen 
would do wel l to remember . 11 94 
91 · Ibid., The Nurnberg Case , p. 161. 
92 Ibid., p. 151. 
93 Ibid., p . 163. 
94 Desmond , Freund , Stewart, and Shawcross , op . cit . , p . 1 30. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Justice Jackson once wrote, "The hard months at Nuremberg (sic.) 
were well spent in the most important, enduring and constructive 
work of my life. 111 In the pages of history , Jackson wanted to be 
remembered most for the important part he played in the Nlirnberg 
trial. Perhaps many of his Supreme Court decisions were more 
significant in shaping our nation ' s laws, but his remarkable 
contributions to the establi shment of an international system of 
law certainly was his greatest accomplishment. 
In October 1941, while the United States claimed neutrality, 
President Roosevelt stated, "One day a frightful retribution would 
2 
be exacted." Again in August 1942 Roosevelt "warned the Axis Powers 
that 'the time will come when they will have to stand in the Courts 
of Law in the very countries they were oppressing and answer for 
their acts. 111 3 These early remarks of President Roosevel t and first 
thoughts of a judicial trial were proposed long before other 
countries had even considered such actions and also before Justice 
Robert H. Jackson became involved. Once the proposal had officially 
1 
Desmond, Freund, Stewart, and Shawcross , op. cit., p . 90. 
2 Ibid., p . 91. 
3 Ibid., p . 92 . 
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been made and other countries had accepted it , the organization of an 
International Mil itary Tribunal began . It was with this beginning 
that "its fulfillment and success depended more upon the wisdom, the 
vision , the organizational capacity , and the leadership of Justice 
Jackson than upon anything else . 11 4 Finally on August 8 , 1945 , the 
"Agreement and Charter of the Internat i onal Tribunal was dul y signed. 
As Mr . Francis Biddle later wrote: ' Robert Jackson ' s tireless energy 
and skill had finally brought t he four nations together- a really 
5 
e xtraordinary feat. '" 
Jackson's predominate concern was to prove the guilt of the 
defendants on the charges of "violation of the laws of legitimate 
warfar e , waging a war of aggression , and crimes against humanity. 11 6 
This he wanted to achieve by presenting sound evidence and reasoning 
to confirm the defendants guilt. His presentation of concrete 
evidence - documents, records , films, photographs , and witnesses -
was quite impressive . As for his reasoning he used for the most part , 
the inductive method: "A result of [the speaker ' s ] observation of 
specific instances or concrete facts ... [formulating] a general 
7 
conclusion or principle deriving from observed data ." To establi sh 
4 Ibid., p. 91. 
5 Ibid . , p. 114 . 
6 New Republic , "To the Nuremberg Court", Robert H. Jackson, 
August 26 , 1946 , p. 232- 33. 
7 Thonssen and Baird, op. cit. , p. 348. 
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the general guilt of the defendants and organizations on trial 
Jackson had pointed out specific discrepancies in their testimonies, 
official orders and personal letters written by them to determine 
their guilt. His use of inductive reasoning was most effective and 
did accomplish his ob jectives. 
Although Jackson ' s major achievement , the organization and out-
come of the trial as a whole, was s uccessful , some of his minor 
attempts were not . Many have criticized Jackson for particul a r 
incidents that occurred during the trial. "Jackson was not immune 
from the human frailties we all possess ," stated Lord Sh awcross , 
"Sometimes he was impatient, occasionally he was irritable. 118 Mr. 
Justice Birkett felt that at times Jackson was "inclined to be 
pompous or even vain. 11 9 
Probably Jackson ' s most unsuccessful moments o f the trial came 
during his cross-examination of Goering . "Your prosecutor Jackson 
is certainly a brillant cross- examiner. Even when he is not sure 
what he will find , he beats on the bu sh to see if a rabbit jumps out 
- and sometimes it does, 1110 Schacht had remarked. To t his Goeri ng 
had replied, "Wait until he starts on me - he won't have any nervous 
! person] to deal with. 1111 "Goering himself was a remarkable man. A 
8 Desmond, Freund , Stewart, and Shawcross , op. c it . , p. 1 25 . 
9 Ibid. 
l O Leonard Mosley , The Reich Marshall: A Biography of Herman 
Goering, (New York : Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1975) , p. 410 . 
11 
Ibid . 
c r iminal n o doubt," said Lord Shawcross , 
"But a courageous one, a man of great ability and of 
outstanding personal ity . One felt of him that in 
some respects h i s personality could dominate the 
whol e proceedings if he sought to make i t so . . .. 
This was a man to be cross-examined in one way onl y -
by following the f i rst axiom of cross-exami nat ion in 
a criminal t rial, which is never to ask a question 
without knowing that there is only one inescapable 
answer to be given to it - usuall y a ' yes ' or a ' no ', 
and by that process to lead the witness up to the 
l ast fatal but inescapable response . 11 12 
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This approach Jackson did not use , however , "His forte was , rath e r , 
advocacy and argument . 11 13 Shawcross cited Jackson ' s lack of success 
as due to his intellectual honesty : "His whole case was to expose the 
evil philosophies with which the Nazis had sought to dominate t he 
world : this inevitably involved him in putting matters of opinion 
and in an argumentative rather than a factual exchange . 11 14 Jackson' s 
failure , perhaps , was not entirely his fault but also that of the 
Tribunal in allowing Goering to make long statements in response to 
Jackson' s questions and not intervening when the situation developed 
and retaining control of the proceedings . 15 As a resul t , the British 
team had " spent the night diggi ng u p documents signed by Goering 
12 
Desmond , Freund , Stewart , and Shawcross , op . cit ., p . 125-26. 
13 
Ibid., 126. p . 




personally showing h im to be a . .. bandit and a thug . 1116 
On the other hand , not all the comments about J ackson were 
negative . Sir Elwyn J ones , Attorney- General of Engl and , said that 
"Jackson was the real driving force that by sheer e nergy and wil l 
got Nuremberg (sic ) under way . 11 17 Another English Judge has 
written , 
"One of the very nice things about Jackson was his 
friendliness to all the lesser lights . .. and the 
other junior members of the British delegation . He 
· was always approachable and ready to help if he 
could . 1118 
The criticisms of the trial were not all directed toward 
Jackson . The trial itself has been criticized by many and the 
historical value of the trial has been questioned. "We must never 
forget ," Jackson had said in his Opening Address , "that the record 
on which we judge these defendants today is the record on which 
history will judge us tomorrow. 1119 Tomorrow has come and some of 
the judgments that have been made are not favorable . George Bailey 
has written , 
16 Ibid . 
17 Ibid , p. 128 . 
18 Ibid . 
19 
Jackson, The Nurnberg Case , . p. 33-34. 
"In destroying the German state by refusing to recognize 
the authority of the German law the victors at Nuremberg 
(sic) undermined the concept of the state in breaching 
i ts defined local authority by proclaiming a higher 
responsibility t o an abstraction called 'international 
l aw ' .... I am not a historian but in the course of my 
general reading I have yet to encounter a spectacle of 
slovenly thinking on the part of professional intellects 
compar abl e to that of the prosecution of Nuremberg (sic) 
,.20 
Hans Fritzsche remarked, 
"A trial of war-guilt and atrocities at t he end of a 
l ong conflict may perhaps, in the abstract , be considered 
a good ~hing. One may welcome the effort to establ ish 
a s upreme international tribunal charged with the duty 
of seeing right is done and pronouncing from aloft a 
New Law for the peoples of the world .. . . But Nuremberg 
(sic) failed to live up to such lofty aims; t here the 
victors uttered the anathema only against the vanquished. 
They sought to establish the guilt of various Germans , 
even of the entire German people; but would break off a 
hearing whenever they saw that the deeds of the Allies 
might be measured by the same yard- stick as those of the 
defeated. Yet the gravest fai l ing of the Nuremberg (sic) 
trial is this : i t failed to transcend the guilt of 
individuals and reach the deeper causes of disaster . 11 21 
20 Bailey , op. cit ., p . 102-103. 
21 Fritzche , op. cit., p. 334-335 . 
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Joe Heydeck e r and - J o h annes Leeb ended their account of the 
Nurnbe rg tria l with this statement: " Someho w the men and events of 
1946 ha v e b ecome inc r edibly remote . 11 22 
Lo r d Shawcross r efl ected , 
" Looking back now, over twenty years later at a worl d stil l 
t o rn wi th l awl essness and war , I cannot preten d t h at t h e t rial 
has so far had the effect on the course of histo r y for which 
we h a d hoped . It i s a matter of bitter disappgintment , i n deed 
o f shame , i n which perhaps we all must share . 11 23 
Even t ho ug h Lo rd Shawcross had recognized the weaknesses o f t he 
trial he concluded , 
"The Nurember g (sic) judgment still stands as a clear statement 
of the law of Nations . If in the end mankind is to survive at 
all its principles must prevail. 11 24 
Just as Lord Shawcross pointed out the strengths , as well as 
the weaknesses of the trial , so did others . The criticisms of the 
trial appeared to be more plentiful from the Ge rmans and German 
sympathi zers . The praises came from historians , newsmen, and 
profess i onal s , etc . Major H. R. Trevor-Roper, a Bri tish Intelligence 
Officer i n charge of the investigation into the truth of Hitler ' s 
death , stated from London by wireless to the New York Times , 
22 Heydecker and Leeb , op. cit . , p . 388 . 
23 
Desmond , Freund , Stewart , and Shawcross , o p . c i t ., p . 135 . 
24 Ibid., p . 1 36. 
"What will history say to t h ese trials? . .. No such court 
has been so universally .xecognized o r its prestige so 
successfully maintained ... Had it not been for this 
e xposure [of the most p rivate documents and most secret 
archives] it would have been possible for a n ew German 
movement in ten ye ar ' s time to mai ntain that the worst 
of Nazi crimes were Allied propaganda easily invented in 
the hour o f such total victory . That is now impossible . 1125 
Justi ce Jackson himself said, 
80 
"The Nuremberg (sic) trial of the Nazi war criminals [prov e d ] 
that always it is worthwhile to give men a hearing . .. Another 
l esson of the Nuremberg (sic) trial is that captives can be 
given a dispassionate hearing even in the immediate aftermath 
of war. 1126 • 
The opinions of these men and countless others have been 
record e d ; their validity is still to be tested . Obviously history 
has been affected by the Nurnberg t rial and its impact has carried 
with it certain contributions as well as certain pitfalls . After thirty 
years , however , the fu ll impact of the trial is perhaps not distant 
when its significance and permanent mark on history will be tested . 
In the writer ' s evaluation of Jackson ' s Opening and Closing 
Address two factors were considered: What was Jackson attempting to 
do and was he successful in his attempt and in keeping with his 
background and l egal philosophy? First , what was J ackso n attempting 
25 
New York Times Magazine, "The Lasting Effects o f the 
Nuremberg Trial , " Major H. R. Trevor-Roper , October 20 , 1946, p . 51. 
26 
New York Times Magazine , - "Justice Jackson Weighs Nuremberg ' s 
Lesson ," Robert H. Jackson, June 16 , 1946, p. 12 . 
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to do? Jackson stated in his Opening Address, "My task is only to 
show the· scale on which these crimes occurred , and to show that these 
are the me n who were in the responsible positions and who conceived 
the plan and design which renders them answerable, regardless of the 
27 fact that the plan was actually executed by others. " The writer 
believes that Jackson, through his presentation of evidence and 
inductive reasoning found in both his speeches , made a s killful and 
l ogically reasoned case. Jackson spoke simply and directly to the 
bench. He made his speeches easy to follow by using such methods 
as topical- chronological ord e r and a listing of facts and reasons. 
The use of these methods a lso aided Jackson because he was abl e to 
l ead the jury through an historical narrati ve of the war detai l ing 
the war crbnes and describing the horrible events that took place. 
On the otherhand , his speeches were l engthy and could have been 
condensed. He was repetitious in parts and appears to have lingered 
much too long on certain issues . This Jackson did for reenforcement, 
but the arguments were well stated and did not require any added 
rhetoric to drive home the point . Overall, J ackson's speeches we re 
bnpressive and very powerful. They were most instrumental in 
determining the outcome of the trial . Speer had described Jackson ' s 
Opening Address as "grand" and "devastating. 11 28 Lord Birkett 
27 . . 
Jackso n , The Nurnberg Case , p. 79. 
28 Speer, op. cit. , p. 513 . 
commented on Jackson ' s advocacy of the trial, 
"In the court itself, sitting as I did on the Bench 
day by day, I had the opportunity of seeing a superb 
exhibition of advocacy , notably in the opening 
speech when he outlined the case for the prosecution 
in most memorable and striking language, and in the 
closing speech when , after many, many months of 
evidence, he made the most masterly summing- up of 
[the case]. The two speeches have been singled out 
by lawyers all over the world as supreme examples of 
advocacy . .. One of the marks of the highest advocacy 
has always been the ability to make an orderly 
presentation to the court of the most complicated facts, 
but it is safe to say that never in the history of 
criminal trials was so complicated a case ever set 
before counsel , and never did any counsel emerge from 
it so triumphantly. These two great speeches , in my 
opinion , are the superb triumphs of his days at 
Nuremberg (sic ) . 11 29 
82 
As for consistency in his work at Nurnberg and his earlier work, 
Jackson ' s ideas and philosophies remained the same. He had always 
upheld justice and the idea of everyman's right to a trial by jury. 
He had assessed the alternatives which were: to free the prisoners, 
or to turn them over the the German law, or to turn them over to the 
individual countries knowing that Great Britain and the Soviet Union 
would shoot them without a trial, or to hold an international trial. 
29 Desmond, Freund, Stewart, and Shawcross, op. cit., p. 88-89 . 
83 
To Jackson the on l y l ogical and justifiable alternative was to hold 
an international trial. There was no indication or evidence anywhere 
to show that Jackson supported the idea of withholding justice. 
Jackson had remarked , "Despite the fact that public opinion already 
condemns their acts , we agree that here they must be given a 
presumption of innocence, and we accept the burden of proving 
criminal acts and t he responsibility of these defendants for their 
. . ,.30 comniss1.on. 
An important observation concerning Jackson ' s struggle for 
fairness was that many did not see it as a struggle for fairness , 
but one of injustice . Leonard Mosley had felt that it was a forgone 
conclusion that the Tribunal had found the defendants guilty even 
31 before the trial began. In Jackson ' s favor , however, was the fact 
that three of the defendants were acquitted and that others were 
only given prison sentences. The fo l lowing is a list of the 

























30 Jackson , The Nurnberg Case , p. 34- 35. 
31 Mosley , op. cit . , p. 432-433. 
Karl Doenitz 
Erich Ralder 
Baldur von Schirach 
Fritz Sauckel 
Al fred Jodl 
Franz von Papen 
Arthur Seyss - Inquart 
Albert Speer 












Note : Goering committed suicide by poison. 
84 
31 
Edward A. Parry , speaking of lawyers , said, " the great lawyer 
is like the accomplished actor; both occupy the stage for a brief 
moment , win applause , and then make their last bow before the cur tain 
fal ls, 11 32 Robert H. J ackson fits thi s description of a great 
lawyer: he occupied the stage at N~nberg for a t ime, won the 
applause of much of the civilized world , and after some 200 
performances made his fina l appeal to the court . Unlike the a ct or's 
performance , however, it will take decades and perhaps the aftermath 
of another g l obal confrontation before the signi ficance of Justice 
Jackson ' s performance can be evaluated in its entirety. 
31 Jackson , The Nurnberg case , p. xii-xiii. 
32 Thonssen and Bai rd , op . cit. , p. 333. 
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APPENDIX 
Definition of Terms 
Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 - A pact by which Germany , Italy, and 
Japan, in common with practically all the nations of the world, 
renounced war as an instrmnent of national policy, bound 
themselves to seek the settlement of disputes only by pacific 
means, and condemned recourse to war for the solution of 
international controversies. 
"Case Barbarossa" - The code name for the invasion of Russia . 
Case Method - A detailed analysis of an individual or group, especiall y 
as an exemplary model of medical , psychological, or social 
phenomena. 
Commando Order - An order by Hitler October 18, 1942, demanding the 
extermination of captured Allied conmandos. 
Commissar - A deputy commissionar in charge of political indoctrination 
and the enforcement of party loyalty. 
Common Law - The system of laws originated and developed in England, 
based on court decision, and on customs and usages , rather than 
on codified written laws. 
Covention for the Definition of Aggression in 1933 - The definition 
was signed at London on July 3 , 1933, by Rumania , Estonia, 
Latavia , Poland, Turkey, The Soviet Union, Persia, Afghanis tan 
It was one of the most authoritative sources on International 
Law. 
Der Sicherheitsdienst (SD) - The Secret State Security Service. 
Deutsche Arbeitsfront - The German Labor Front , a Nazi controlled 
labor bureau, directed by Robert Ley to teach the Nazi philosophy 
to German workers and to weed out from industrial employment all 
who were from industrial employment all who were backward in 
their lessons. 
Die Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo) - The Secret State Police. 
Die Schutzstaffeln (SS) - The Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party. 
Die Sturmabteilungen (SA) - The Nationalist Socialist Assault Troops, 
known as the "brownshirts". 
Eighth Assembly by the League of Nations in 1927 - A resolution by 
the representatives of forty-eight member nations, including 
Germany , declaring that a war of aggression constituted an 
international crime. 
Geneva Protocal of 1924 - The protocal was for the Pacific Settlement 
of International Disputes and signed by the representatives of 
forty- eight governments . It declared that a war of aggression 
constit uted an internati onal crime. 
Hague Convention - An agreement which forbade the attacking of a ship 
without warning and the use of prisoners of war in armament 
factori es or any labor connected with the fighting . 
Nacht und Nebel - German for ' Night and Fog ' referring to the secret 
removal of Jews and other political suspects during the night 
leaving no word of their whereabouts. 
Nurnberg Decrees - Ordered on September 5, 1935 , deprived t he Jews 
of German citizenship , confining them to the status of 
"subjects. " 
Sixth Pan-American Conference of 1928 - The twenty-one Amer ican 
Republics unanimously adopted a resolution stating that a war 
of aggression constitutes an international crime against the 
human species. 
